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FBIS-EEU-95-242 *18 December 1995*

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Shkoder Police Fail To Lift FRY Embargo

AU1512181095 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 13 Dec 95 p 5

[Article by Arlinda Causholli: "Still an Embargo on the Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shkoder—The embargo is still in full effect in Albania. Even though the UN Security Council has lifted economic sanctions against the war zone and all states have acted on this order, bureaucratic confusion on the desks of the Albanian police has caused a great deal of chaos at the border crossings with Montenegro. Lines of vehicles are waiting to cross the border in order to resume their old trade with our neighbor. However, the lack of a signature on the order revoking the instruction to position police checkpoints at Han i Hotit and Muriqan has endlessly complicated the free activities of Shkoder merchants. While the customs allow traffic to pass, the police raise their "stop" signals and explain, "We have still received no order from above." The Shkoder Commissariat confirms this report. Two weeks ago, an order from the General Customs Directorate arrived at the Qafe Prushi, Kukes, and Shkoder customs offices, which include Han i Hotit and Bajze under their jurisdiction, and the northern border was opened. However, another order with similar contents from the Public Order Ministry should have been sent to those in charge of the boys in blue. It has still not come...but is expected to arrive. It was 14 December last year when the Public Order Ministry issued an order to set up checkpoints at "sensitive" points on Albanian territory. The aim of this was to raise insuperable obstacles to the flood of tanker-trucks filled with fuel. In fact, this order should have been superseded by a second one, so that Shkoder could open its borders and its inhabitants could cross freely to sell their goods and slip a few notes into their wallets. The first to "inaugurate" the border crossing will be trucks loaded with flour. "I am waiting for free trade to begin. The government has removed the tax on flour and this is a very favorable factor," Halil Nurja from Koplik explained. "Many merchants will act as I will, and I am sure that thousands of metric tons will enter Albania." Only the written order is necessary. Vojvodina, which has a very fine reputation throughout the world for its famous flour which requires no processing, is to sell its produce on the Albanian market. "It is of course an opportunity to have Vojvodina close at hand," Nurja continues. "They even have sales contracts with the faraway United States." Meanwhile, the vehicles stand in line with their drivers sighing, "Trouble with the embargo, trouble without it." One hopes that it will only be a matter of days before bureaucracy clears the border.

Italian Embassy, Investors Form Association

AU1512163795 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 12 Dec 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Italian Investors Unite"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Italian investors in Albania are now united. A consultative committee will soon be created to coordinate Italian-Albanian cooperation. The Italian Embassy in Tirana has taken this initiative and will crown it in the Hotel Tirana at 1000 on Saturday, 16 December. This meeting will mark the birth of the new association. The association will act to consolidate and further encourage Italian investment in Albania. The embassy itself has drawn up the association's aims and has compiled a draft statute that will be presented to those attending on Saturday. The embassy's Commercial Office, which has been following the work of Italian-Albanian companies in Tirana for years, has an important part to play in this association. Italian investments occupy a very important place in Albania and are recognized as substantial in many important fields such as banking, the retail sector, and construction. There have been plenty of problems, both on the Albanian and the Italian sides, caused by incompetent and dishonest people who have managed to get inside Albania.

Turkey To 'Abolish' Entry, Transit Visas

AU1512163195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Turkish Government has informed the Albanian Government that, considering the intensive and friendly relations between Albania and Turkey and proceeding from the goal of further facilitating the movements of Albanian citizens who want to go to Turkey, the Turkish Government has decided to abolish as of 1 January 1996 the obligation to get entry or transit visas for Turkey from the Turkish Embassy.

After this date, the Albanian citizens will be able to enter Turkey by carrying out a simple formality at the border.

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Zhelev Addresses Nation on EU Membership

AU1512204095 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 15 Dec 95

[Address to nation by President Zhelyu Zhelev on 15 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed compatriots,

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, supported by the National Assembly, adopted a decision to apply for Bulgaria's full-fledged membership in the European Union. Thus we confirmed our willingness to follow the logic of the integration process and implement our commitments ensuing from the European agreement on association.

This act places us alongside the other Central European countries, which already submitted their applications.

As the president of the Republic, in the implementation of my constitutional duties, I greet the decision of the government as well as the willingness declared by the National Assembly members to work for our becoming members of the EU. This decision also corresponds to my personal commitment as the head of state.

Since 1990 until today, I have never stopped working for the modernization and democratization of the Bulgarian state, i.e., for its joining the European space of peace, prosperity, and security.

We must succeed in turning our willingness to conduct reforms into a reality. This is the only real preparation for a full-fledged membership in the European structures. What is necessary for our success?

First of all—the political willingness. It has been declared already in 1990. The governments and National Assemblies after 1990 never questioned this willingness. I would like to thank all those who conducted the successful talks on association and on achieving the necessary agreements with our EU partners. Today we must turn this festively declared willingness into action. We must not allow any contradictions between intentions and real actions. This could become a dangerous source of disappointment.

New structures are necessary, as well as state institutions acting democratically and the balanced relations between the representatives of various branches which characterize a democratic state. Those institutions must prove their efficiency.

A radical reform of the central and municipal administration is imminent. It must bring the activity of our institutions in line with the activity of the European institutions. Otherwise, the lagging behind, which unfortunately is still evident, will strengthen even more. Let us not forget that it is our basic commitment to strengthen and enhance our ability to meet the challenges of an open society.

It is necessary to conduct a radical economic reform in all its dimensions—legal and structural alike. The economic parameters of our cooperation with the EU are the basic criteria according to which our readiness to become a full-fledged member will be judged. The economic reforms will guarantee the success of our transition to democracy. I am convinced that the Bulgarian society will demonstrate intolerance to all deviations from the basic principles of the democratic state and the market economy, toward every inefficiency and hesitation, and toward any delay in implementing the commitments ensuing from the European agreement on association.

It is necessary to participate actively in the various forms of regional cooperation—both in the Balkans and Central Europe. Thus we will master the principles and mechanisms of the big and multisided cooperation in Europe. The ability to develop regional cooperation is one of the basic criteria of EU membership.

Finally, we need the commitment of all Bulgarian citizens—the basic actors of the European integration. A total transparence in the action of the institutions directly engaged in the European processes is necessary. It is necessary to inform the civic society about the mechanisms and instruments of the European cooperation. It is only in this manner that we will be able to guarantee the full interest of the citizens in our striving to assume a worthy place in Europe.

I wish success in implementing our people's universal willingness to become full-fledged members of the EU. Tomorrow in Madrid, I will have the honor to express this universal willingness during the EU summit.

Opposes Judicial Review

AU1512152395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 15 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a position statement sent to the Constitutional Court and disseminated by BTA, President Zhelyu Zhelev opposes the demand of a group of deputies that the Constitutional Court review certain public statements made by President Zhelev and determine whether they represent a violation of the Constitution.

The head of state points out that he essentially opposes this demand. According to him it is absurd to maintain that the head of state is different, and stays above, under, or beside the country's political life and institutions. Such a position is harmful to the Constitution itself, the president says. In addition, the Constitution cannot be

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violated by words. The violations of the Constitution are carried out by actions, or lack of actions, but not by words, the president claims.

BSP Infighting, Cabinet Shuffle Discussed

Lilov on Videnov's Tasks

AU1512204195 Sofia REPORTER 7 in Bulgarian 8-15 Dec 95 pp 8-9

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, member of the BSP Supreme Council, by Svetlana Tikhova; place and date not given: "Is Lilov Inviting King Simeon II To Be President?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tikhova] Is the claim that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will support Zhelev in the presidential elections well founded?

[Lilov] I see no reason for such support. [passage omitted]

[Tikhova] You nominated Zhan Videnov as your heir. What is your impression of his year as government head?

[Lilov] As far as a comprehensive assessment of Videnov as prime minister is concerned, I think that it is too early for this. If Videnov really succeeds in forming a strong cabinet, capable of making evident steps in leading the country out of the crisis, he would not only cope with his grave responsibility as a prime minister, but will also facilitate future mandates. Everything depends on him.

[Tikhova] Does this mean that the cabinet should be reshuffled?

[Lilov] I cannot say anything new on this topic. I think that changes in a cabinet are a sign of strength, not weakness. If they are necessary, they must be effected. I think that such changes are mandatory.

[Tikhova] Do you specifically mean Vasil Chichibaba's ministry [of Agriculture]?

[Lilov] I will not name specify ministries. There are areas in which our progress is very weak, and there are areas in which unfavorable events are taking place. One should react to this without any delay.

[Tikhova] Should the prime minister react or should there first be pressure "from below?"

[Lilov] The initiative belongs to the prime minister because he carries the responsibility.

[Tikhova] How do you assess the parliamentary faction of the democratic left? Are you critical of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] for not being able to take away votes from the People's Union?

[Lilov] If you are interested in my opinion about the elections, here it is: I think that the success of the democratic left in the elections is more than obvious. I do not know whether we succeeded in taking away votes from somebody, but I know, and everyone sees this, that three-quarters of the municipal authorities are in the hands of the democratic left.

Purvanov on Party's Future

AU1312181595 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 11 Dec 95 p 5

[Interview with Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, by Iglika Miteva; place and date not given: "Dialogue Between the Leading Party and the Media Has Been Disrupted"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Miteva] The Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] recently invited the ambassadors of the EU states and briefed them on the position of the leftist forces in Kurdzhali. You have been personally accused of calling for an ethnic vote.

[Purvanov] I think that the entire DPS activity could be attributed to the intention that Ahmed Dogan expressed at the beginning of the election campaign, namely, to use all means, both allowed and banned, to win the elections in Kurdzhali. It appears that the DPS leaders decided to stress the banned means and, if you mention ethnic voting, then I think that this was provoked by the DPS. Look at the situation in the other 25 municipalities where the DPS won. Those are 25 municipalities where the Turkish population is dominant. Why did the DPS not win in places with a different ethnic population? [passage omitted]

[Miteva] Mr. Dogan said that you would not be admitted to the Socialist International because of the policy that you were conducting and that he personally would make sure of that.

[Purvanov] For us, it is important to gain admission to such an important international organization as the Socialist International. However, Mr. Dogan and every other opponent must understand that entering the Socialist International is not a goal in itself and that from an internal point of view we will make no unacceptable compromises just to gain admission. However, this act proves that the Luchezar Toshev [a National Assembly member of the Union of Democratic Forces, who in a recent trip abroad spoke against the Socialist cabinet at various international forums] disease is characteristic not only of the right side of the National Assembly, but

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also for the DPS. They have not done anything positive in the last five years, except negatively presenting in Europe the situation in Bulgaria.

[Miteva] Recently, the cabinet has frequently been accused of undemocratic practices. Part of the accusations came from your own party and restrictions on freedom of speech have been pointed to as an example.

[Purvanov] I think that the failure to establish a more responsible dialogue with the mass media is one of the greatest shortcomings of our administration. Both the cabinet and the parliamentary faction are not succeeding in satisfactorily explaining our actions to the public and they are allowing others to interpret them. I am saying this with a large degree of self-criticism, but I reject the claim that there is censorship. No one has intended to or has taken any steps aimed at restricting the mass media. The precise diagnosis is an insufficiently fruitful dialogue between the leading party and the mass media. [passage omitted]

[Miteva] The strategist Aleksandur Lilov has said in an interview that the emergence of a new right-wing party from Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] circles is possible. What is the situation in the BSP in this respect?

[Purvanov] I will accept any proposal on starting a new discussion on this issue, even though the issue has generally been resolved in the party program that was adopted through an all-party referendum last year. With this program we advanced from a class party to a party with a national character. In this context, any attempt to seek the isolation of the representatives of the capital on the one hand, and present the party as a typical working people's or workers' party on the other, is an obsolete formulation on which we have already turned our backs. The BSP, as well as all the other nationally responsible parties, must move in a different direction on the basis of defending the interests of various social groups, rather than relying on a typical class element. [passage omitted]

[Miteva] Presidential elections will be held next year. Do you think that there is a chance that an independent candidate will be nominated?

[Purvanov] It is difficult to say. As far as I know, the orientation of all party headquarters, including the BSP's, is to seek a party candidate, i.e., not to escape from a purely party responsibility. Nevertheless, if a strong independent candidate emerges, or a strong duo, it could receive a large part of the votes of the Bulgarian citizens in the second round, because I think that the presidential institution includes a need to embody the national consensus. In this context, I think that interesting developments in Bulgarian politics still lie ahead of us.

[Miteva] Do you see President Zhelev winning another term?

[Purvanov] No. I think that Mr. Zhelev has exhausted the modest possibilities as a political figure that he had at the beginning of his term. I think that he would be unlikely to receive the support of most of the voters of the BSP and the Union of Democratic Forces and that his attempts to bluff the voters with the support of the DPS and partially the People's Union will produce only a modest result.

ASO Leader on Dangers

AU1612154395 Sofia NOVINI PLYUS in Bulgarian 9-15 Dec 95 p 11

[Interview with Valentin Vatsev, leader of the Alternative Socialist Association, ASO, in the BSP, by Valentin Georgiev; place and date not given: "The Cabinet Is Like Group Sappers Under Whose Feet Mines Constantly Explode"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Georgiev] Where did the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] fail?

[Vatsev] On the one hand, it is firmly in the power. The government is stable, and the suggestions that the governing process is in a crisis are absolutely groundless. On the other hand, in a pathetically helpless manner, the BSP cannot clearly declare its achievements and problems. Thus, it finds itself in the situation of a great but almost mute force. What we have here is an inadmissible lack of understanding for the importance of the mass media and a Komsomol-like confidence of our high-ranking leaders in following the rule "The important thing is to do the job; the people will somehow notice this." [passage omitted]

[Georgiev] You maintain that there is no crisis in the governing process. Then how are we supposed to explain the government's troubles?

[Vatsev] Videnov and his ministers are like a group of sappers who know that they are in a mine field but do not know the exact location of the mines. There is always the danger that a mine could explode under their feet—which has already happened several times—and it is clear that the explosions will continue. However, no government is without problems. As far as I know, they do not care about their feet, and in addition, for every man who lost his legs, there will always be at least two others with healthy legs....

[Georgiev] Could you identify some of the "mines"?

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[Vatsev] For example, the so-far successful attempts of the cabinet to introduce some order in the finance-economic sphere. There are daily silent explosions in this sphere. I can also point to the attempts to effect privatization in the manner it was promised and the attempts to manage the state property.

The government is encountering a monstrous resistance in anything related to privatization. Interests that were completely contradictory until a day or two ago united against the privatization, and it is clear why. What we have here is the greatest redistribution of property in our most modern history, greater even than the nationalization after 9 September 1944.

[Georgiev] Was the municipal elections victory a new mandate or an assessment of what has been done so far?

[Vatsev] This is a Jesuitical question because it contains in itself the clash of two contradicting claims.

The BSP leadership, headed by Zhan Videnov, maintains that the election victory is a public mandate. Aleksandur Lilov hastens to say that this is a loan and a debt the cabinet assumes, and that the cabinet should not hasten to draw new credits, before it has paid its old ones.

Actually, what we have here is two different assessments of the cabinet's performance.

[Georgiev] Could you comment on Lilov's claim that the establishment of a rightist party is "inevitable and necessary," and that he does not exclude the possibility that the part of BSP which is connected with the capital could join this party?

[Vatsev] This is an exceptionally reactionary claim which bodes a split in the BSP. We are entering a paradoxical period if the leader of the internal party reformers, Lilov, dons the armor of historical materialism, while the ardent champion of party unity today not only longs for a split, but is actually preparing it. What we have here is not incorrect political assessments, but exceptionally dangerous political actions.

I do not know why Lilov maintains this. I categorically adhere to the opposite position. The establishment of a rightist party is neither inevitable nor necessary. Our history since 10 November 1989 demonstrates how such attempts have been made and how they failed. Now, six years later, it is time to say why such attempts are failing.

[Georgiev] What is your forecast?

[Vatsev] I think that this attempt will fail and history will prove Aleksandur Lilov wrong.

[Georgiev] Is there a conflict between Lilov and Videnov?

[Vatsev] There is no conflict. There are constant, and so far successful, attempts by the young party leader to free himself from any internal party influences. I dare even say that sometimes Videnov imagines attempts to commit him to a certain position and conducts a fierce war against such imaginary attempts.

As far as Lilov is concerned, I think that he continues to feel like the Ideologist and Strategist. He was called "the Strategist" first by Velislava Dureva, and she did not mean it as a compliment. The people expected Lilov to be insulted, but this did not happen. If he had a sense of justice, he should have organized a stipend for Dureva to go abroad.... [passage omitted]

Weekly Delineates Factions

AU1512202095 Sofia REPORTER 7 in Bulgarian 8-15 Dec 95 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "BSP Splits Along Two Seams"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the politicians in our country carried out a strategic redeployment of their forces. The result was the emergence of two unconventional messages.

The first came from the group around Aleksandur Lilov. Svetlin Rusev [noted painter], who is very close to Lilov, is a leading critic of the coat-of-arms proposed by Videnov. It is difficult to assume that the painter would initiate any actions outside Lilov's strategic scheme. In the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], he is supported by Yanaki Stoilov and Georgi Purvanov, who support having a crown in the coat-of-arms and confirmed their adherence to the strategist [Aleksandur Lilov]. Thus, they emerged as Videnov's basic opposition within the BSP.

President Zhelev also sent messages. The first was to the Turks, namely, that he is prepared to do anything for their votes, and the second—to the BSP—that he expects the BSP's support. He also said that serious circles within the BSP will indeed support him. The president most likely is relying on the support of his old acquaintances Andrey Lukanov, Chavdar Kyuranov, Dimitur Yonchev, Stefan Prodev, and Velislava Dureva, and to a lesser degree, on Elena Poptodorova, Filip Bokov, and the former Communists from Alternative Social Liberal Party, the Alternative Socialist Association-Independent, and the Europe Social Democratic Club. Such support could hardly lead to nominating Zhelev as the official BSP candidate. However, things could fundamentally change if the president invites a prominent member of the democratic left to join his team.

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Internal Pressure for Change

AU1512163495 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 12 Dec 95 pp 12-13

[Article by Ivo Indzhov: "Internal Party Demands for Cabinet Reshuffle Intensify"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Generally, the cabinet is implementing its program. However, a part of our society, including members and supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] are justified in not being satisfied with the government's actions in the spheres of financial, social, and agrarian management and the struggle against crime. In those spheres it is necessary to correct the management and adopt more decisive political actions." This is what Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, said at the last "Panorama" program on Bulgarian television.

It was not by chance that Stoilov put his finger on the sore point on the eve of resolving the most urgent task of the rulers—adopting the 1996 budget.

Theoretically, the budget issue does not appear to be complicated. Videnov already announced his demand to adopt it at a first reading by Christmas. The parliamentary majority, needed for the implementation of this operation, exists. However, the difficulties will come later.

After performing the trick of increasing the 1995 budget deficit and producing a beautiful draft budget for 1996, the government no longer has any justification to postpone answering the nerve-racking questions posed by Yanaki Stoilov.

Soon the cabinet will complete the first year of its tenure. Despite the optimistic inflation statistics and the assurance of Interior Minister Nachev regarding the decreasing crime and so forth, the balance of the past 12 months will hardly be very pleasant.

The prime minister must have realized by now that some of the personnel issues he adopted while forming the cabinet, were more than unsuccessful. Inevitably, Positano 20 [the BSP headquarters] will soon yell: "The Emperor has no clothes!"

The signs are visible. More than a few socialist leaders are already quietly uttering certain truths. Every month or so the strategist Aleksandur Lilov reminds us that cabinet changes are not a sin. "This must be viewed calmly and accepted as something fully natural. I think that there are spheres in which this is mandatory. I hope that we will not be late in effecting prudent and necessary changes. I believe that the prime minister will come out with such an initiative"—this is what he publicly said very recently.

Professor Vladimir Topencharov, member of the BSP Supreme Council's Executive Bureau, added his voice to Lilov's and told STANDART NEWS that "Videnov has not succeeded in leading the governmental administration out of the very grave lethargy in which it fell in the last few years." In addition, he said that politically irresponsible advisers are wasting the party leader and prime minister.

To top everything, last weekend Stefan Gaytandzhiev, leader of the leftist ecologists, who until recently was considered a supersecure socialist satellite, said in the province that if it appears that ministers are involved in the grain affair, perhaps they will have to go "together with Videnov at the head." What he said was precise and clear—as it should be in the civilized world. It must be remembered that the old apparatchik—this is how Gaytandzhiev is being described both by the BSP and Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] to which he used to belong in the past—seldom allows himself accidental radical statements.

In order to continue to the end of the four-year mandate the Socialists received last year, the prime minister must get rid as soon as possible of several ministers who have discredited themselves, such as Lyubomir Nachev [internal affairs], Vasil Chichibaba [agriculture and food industry], Ilcho Dimitrov [education], and Mimi Vitkova [health], as well as the Post and Telecommunications Committee head Lyubomir Kolarov, whose special and major blunders already prompted acrimonious commentaries on the part of foreign news agencies.

Videnov's nervousness, which becomes ever more evident, implies that he himself clearly understands that he must save himself as soon as possible from the so-called advisers, who have already been criticized from all directions, and a large part of the ministers, who have been found with the advisers' help. It is a completely different issue whether Videnov is viewing the warning external signals as an indication that he himself could be replaced, or as benevolent advice.

Since Videnov's tendency to listen to all sorts of opinions prior to making a decision, but then to categorically make his moves alone, is well-known, it could be assumed that the prime minister is ready to implement a cabinet shuffle. However, he alone will determine the timing of this move, most likely, when according to his assessment the reshuffle could be implemented with the most painless results for his own image. Internal socialist circles have often discussed the ambitions of the former Komsomol leader, and have assessed them as a quality which occasionally could be beneficial, but generally, is damaging not only for Videnov himself.

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One way or another, by now Videnov surely knows that his team cannot play any longer in its current composition. Changes must be made urgently. Otherwise the difficult 1996 which is coming upon us—with the heavy foreign debt payments, grain crisis, and the emerging social unrest—could easily relegate Videnov's team to a lower (party) league.

Russian Minister Backs Tests on Kozloduy Unit

AU1512144495 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 12 Dec 95 p 9

[Interview with Viktor Sidorenko, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, by Eleonora Petrova; place and date not given: "We Assume Responsibility for Our Recommendations Regarding the Safe Use of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant First Reactor"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Petrova] Mr. Sidorenko, What will happen to the first reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant when its 18th year of activity ends this coming spring?

[Sidorenko] In Kozloduy, together with the Bulgarian experts, we specified a program on the scope of the work necessary for extending the operation not only of the first, but of all reactors. In the past months, we have supported the position of the Bulgarian experts on restarting the first reactor and continuing its operation in the state that it is now. Our support is based on the entire scope of the knowledge we have from the very beginning. However, if we are to guarantee the operation of the reactor in the next years, it would be necessary to complete certain tests that began earlier and to conduct some new ones.

On the other hand, we are seeking a global solution to the issue of continuing the utilization of the Russian reactors until the end of their planned term of operation. The issue is not only related to the first reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, which has evoked much reaction. Later on, we must work out a specific program for modernizing every reactor, because they differ from one another. This is a component part of those problems, which, in principle, are related to the reactors of the first generation. There are also such reactors in Russia, and we are working toward their modernization with the goal of guaranteeing their safe operation until the end of their planned period of operation. If our Bulgarian colleagues pursue the same goal, we are prepared to share our experience and render our support.

The Russian side is prepared to support the decision to take samples from the structure of the first reactors and to assume responsibility for the correctness of its recommendations. In order to guarantee the correctness of the recommendations, the Russian experts have worked out a clear program that they consider sufficient and necessary. Taking samples from the structure's material, something that will provide specific information about the condition of the structure, is a part of our program's basic complex. [passage omitted]

[Petrova] Does the nuclear power supply have a future in Bulgaria, and will Russia participate in the possible completion of the Belene nuclear power plant?

[Sidorenko] While analyzing Russia's comprehensive power supply strategy, it was necessary to confirm whether the development of the nuclear power supply is desirable and necessary. Our conclusion was that Russia has many different sources of power. We think that the nuclear power supply is necessary. I think that the situation in Bulgaria is the same. The development of your power supply must also be assessed within the framework of the comprehensive power supply strategy.

I think that the participation of Russian experts in designing and completing the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant is natural and correct. As far financing is concerned—you should direct this question to your cabinet. I think that this is inevitable. One must seek all forms of participation on the part of both countries.

Ruse Shipbuilders Declare Indefinite Strike

AU1812123395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The shipbuilders in Ruse declared an indefinite strike as of this morning. At a protest rally they declared their demands: payment of their wages for the last five months and a loan to guarantee their jobs. Our correspondent Natasha Dimitrova has sent this on-the-spot report on developments:

[Dimitrova] About 1,000 shipbuilding workers gathered at 0730 this morning to hold a protest rally in front of the main gates of the shipyard. Ivaylo Kiryunov, the local leader of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], reminded the workers of the background to the discontent and stated the latest facts that provoked new tension among the shipbuilders. There have been many promises and many hopes, he said, adding that the Ruse firm remains the only Bulgarian producer of river vessels.

[Begin Kiryunov recording] The prospects ahead of us are ideal, but the problem is that no decisions have been adopted. From the beginning of 1995 until this moment, I would say that we have constantly tried to be constructive. We proposed a solution to this situation, but so far there has been no reaction. [end recording]

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[Dimitrova] The trade union committee called for a shutdown of production today, and indicated that the strike may continue until the end of the year. In the meantime, it has become known that the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development will meet today, and if it fails to grant the promised loan of $8 million—the amount needed to enable fulfillment of the contracts concluded with foreign customers, then in the new year the workers plan to leave the shipyard on a mass scale.

Shot Fired at Egyptian Envoy's House an Accident

NC1312161395 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1539 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Cairo, 13 Dec (MENA)—Investigations carried out by Bulgarian authorities have revealed that the bullet fired at the Egyptian ambassador's residence in Sofia several weeks ago was fired accidentally by a child playing with a hunting pistol in the house opposite that of the ambassador's residence.

Security sources reported that several security personnel conducted a swift investigation into the incident after the bullet was fired at the residence. They discovered that a child had been playing with the hunting pistol on the balcony of his house when the bullet was fired by accident.

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Meciar on Hopes for Madrid EU Summit

LD1512183895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 15 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The summit of EU member states representatives opened in Madrid this morning. [passage omitted] Editor Peter Stano interviewed Vladimir Meciar, the Slovak prime minister, prior to his departure for the EU summit.

[Begin recording] [Stano] Prime Minister, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez said at a news conference at the beginning of the Spanish chairmanship of the European Union that the participation of representatives from the Central European countries or associated countries in the Madrid summit was unlikely. In October, at a news conference in New York, he said that participation of these countries' representatives was counted on. When you visited Spain in July you said that, together with the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, you asked Felipe Gonzalez that the countries undergoing transformation be represented at Madrid summit. What, in your opinion, led the representatives of the EU to invite you to the summit?

[Meciar] One should not overestimate the significance of our participation in the summit because, essentially, when we come to the meeting, the conclusions will have been made. We are not members of the European Union. Then, there is a special part of the deliberations attended by representatives of the associated countries. We will have the opportunity to speak there, but there is no debate at that meeting and no conclusions will be made. We are just told the conclusions. Despite this, the information which will have been submitted there is always timely and has quality because it provides the competent bodies with authentic texts and it stimulates the governments to behave in a certain way. That is why we tried to get to the Madrid meeting in order to find out how the intergovernmental commission was getting ready. It will start work in 1996 and will work until 1997. Half a year after it finishes work, talks with the associated countries are expected—that means talks about us. This preparatory phase must be well handled by us. On the other hand, in our countries, in the associated countries, above all the Central European ones, awareness is growing to the effect that success is possible only by coordinated joint progress. In this respect, a great role was played by meetings in Warsaw, Brno, and also my meeting with Mr. Horn in the High Tatras; meetings where these steps were coordinated and their results are now seen in our participation in Spain and by the attempts to call a meeting of prime ministers of the associated countries in Slovakia, probably in March. We also talked about joint progress, an intergovernmental conference which might have its historical significance because it would pave the way for a new dimension of integration in Europe.

[Stano] Following the meeting with your partner Felipe Gonzalez in July, you expressed the expectation that Spain would support more efficiently the practical steps towards our countries' joining the structures of the Union. Has Spain fulfilled your expectations during the six months of its chairmanship?

[Meciar] We have no right to judge Spain as a chairing country because many things are the internal affairs of the European Union and we, as an associated country, are finding out about them only to the extent they are obligated to tell us. In relation to Slovakia, however, this assessment has been very embarrassing.

[Stano] What are the reasons?

[Meciar] There was no chance to establish dialogue, as we assumed would happen during the meeting with Mr. Gonzalez. The progress was not as expected during the meeting either.

[Stano] Whose fault is it then that this dialogue has not materialized? Slovakia submitted its application for EU membership at the last EU summit in Cannes. Article 12 of the memorandum of the Slovak Government, which accompanies this application, states that "we consider political dialogue as one of the highly positive examples of the process of the integration of associated countries into the EU." The political dialogue developed during 1994 to acquire the form of concrete cooperation, spanning from the level of experts to that of ministerial meetings. The subsequent months and, eventually, your own words proved that the assessment of dialogue presented in the memorandum was apparently exaggerated. Where is the fault?

[Meciar] A dialogue cannot be viewed as a technical mediation of talks, but as a structurally and hierarchically organized entity. A dialogue of this type is going on permanently. It assumes different forms of varying intensity and there is no vacuum.

However, the intensity of our dialogue was lower than would have been needed with regard to the requirements with which we are faced and with regard to the issues which have to be answered. Moreover, our association agreement defines a mechanism for discussing controversial issues, or issues of which the other party believes to be as important as to require discussion. This mechanism has not been put to practice so far. A mechanism which makes use of demarches is not in accordance with the association agreement.

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[Stano] What can Slovakia expect from its participation in the Madrid summit?

[Meciar] Very much. We shall learn what is the position held by the representatives of the EU countries on the results of their talks and on the preparations made by the intergovernmental commission. We shall have an opportunity to report on the progress of our preparations for integration into the EU and we shall be able to say what is our vision of the period before the opening of the intergovernmental conference. We shall have a chance to meet other associated countries and share our views, attitudes, as well as our stands on the preparations for a meeting to take place in Slovakia in March 1996. [end recording]

Assesses Relations With Hungary

LD1512222595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1740 GMT 15 Dec 95

[Regular Friday interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Bernard Hornak, place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hornak] Prime Minister, at the time when this interview is broadcast you were supposed to be in Madrid at the EU summit. The date of this important trip was changed at the very last moment. You will be leaving for Madrid tomorrow [16 December]. What was the cause for this change?

[Meciar] The main talks will be held on Saturday. Friday's schedule included bilateral talks and opportunities for contacting other officials since in these multilateral talks as much can be achieved within several hours as is achieved on other occasions within several days.

The preparations for my meetings were poor, especially their propaganda part concerning some statements made by the president, which referred to my government. As a result, (?I have changed my mind) and I am only going to take part in the official part [of the EU summit].

[Hornak] According to Bundestag deputy Christian Schmidt, now, after having received a demarche from—among others—the EU, it is necessary for Slovakia to send positive signals to the EU. Prime Minister, do you think that you could make certain promises of such nature as early as on Saturday in Madrid?

[Meciar] Madrid talks will not deal with this issue, although, undoubtedly, I can react to certain relevant facts in the discussion. We have not sent out any negative signal yet. I would put it this way: the fault is not in our transmitter, but in the receiver. As for our transmitter—that is the Slovak Republic as a whole—it is true that information [about Slovakia] was received [by the outside world] from the opposition. Some information was relayed via diplomatic channels. Some official representatives, and the president in particular, said things that were received as facts and are being verified only now. After this verification, everything seems to be different and unlike it seemed to be in the original text of demarches. That is why several talks resulted in the reassessment of the position or in suggestions that what happened is over, let it be, and let us focus on the positive work for the future. The latter position is, on the whole, acceptable to us.

[Hornak] Papers this week published reports about your possible meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn at the European Union summit in Madrid. However, on Wednesday [13 December] evening the office of the government issued a statement that the meeting would not take place. Does this mean that the most pressing problems between Slovakia and Hungary have already been more or less sorted out or does it mean that at present there is simply not enough political will to hold such a meeting?

[Meciar] During a session like this, there is always a chance to meet each other and exchange a few words. However, this cannot count as a planned meeting. I personally, my secretariat or the protocol department, have not planned such a meeting. It was simply an unsubstantiated report in a paper taken up by the media. The important talks were those between the foreign ministers, Mr. [Laszlo] Kovacs and Mr. [Juraj] Schenk, during which many disputed issues were clarified.

The central issue is the one of the adoption of the State Language Law. It is the law on Slovak language; it is not a law on minority languages. Therefore, it should not be subject to bilateral talks or be looked at in the context of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty clauses on minority languages. [passage omitted]

[Hornak] As regards Slovak-Hungarian relations, they are currently dominated in our country by the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty which is on the agenda of the 12th session of the National Council [Slovak parliament]. You have said several times that this document, the signing of which had been applauded by Europe and the world, will be ratified by the Slovak parliament. Are you still convinced about it now, when the going is getting tough and even within the government coalition views have emerged which more or less contradict your view?

[Meciar] First of all, I would like to confirm that this document will be ratified by the National Council of the Slovak Republic [parliament]. Look, if I could not trust the government coalition on this issue, I would have sought the support of the opposition—and I have not.

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This is, in my view, one of the signals which should be easy to read. [passage omitted]

If somebody sees it as an anti-Hungarian document, look, they would have never accepted it—it has to be acceptable to both sides. [passage omitted]

This document can still be ratified at this session of the National Council though there is a question mark over it following an inappropriate reaction by the Hungarian side, above all by the [Hungarian] government. They turned the entire matter into an international issue even before acquainting themselves with the State Language Law and addressed institutions which do not have any powers to act in this matter. Moreover, they cast doubt on the entire foreign policy and strategic orientation of Slovakia.

I think that these issues have now been clarified and our deputies should be given an opportunity to take these facts into account. [passage omitted]

I think as we signed it [words indistinct], we will also manage to have it ratified by the National Council, to push it through. It will be a good contribution toward our future relations. This is one of the decisions that means a breakthrough in our history and is forcing us to think differently.

However, without good relations between us and without being able to settle things in our neighborhood, it will not be demarches but ourselves that stop our march toward integrated Europe. [passage omitted]

Document Against Treaty Ratification Described

AU1512210095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "A Document Opposed to the Ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty Has Turned Up in Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak National Party Deputy B. Kunc proposed in parliament on 11 December that the ratification of the treaty between Slovakia and Hungary be postponed until the two sides agree on an identical interpretation of it. The proposal was supported by 18 deputies from the ruling coalition (not by one from the opposition!). In parliament the next day, we were handed a four-page document concerning the text of the treaty. We have learned from coalition circles that this is the initiative of Deputy M. Hornacek of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and, after comparing the style of the document with articles written by the columnist J. Handzarik (in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA), have found several common attributes that point to joint authorship. The document is divided into three parts: A, B, and C. In the first one, it states, among other things, that the draft treaty is not formulated on the principle of equality and reciprocity and is unclear, vague, and equivocal. Pressure from a third state (France) was applied in the drafting, signing, and formulation of the treaty; therefore, it cannot be ruled out that a form of arbitrage will not be used in the future, says the document. The authors also point out that the effects of the treaty's inequality are manifesting themselves now prior to its ratification in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] in that the "Hungarian side now considers and proclaims the text of the treaty to be setting the norm and is observing it by the gradual implementation of its own expansionist anti-Slovak programs enshrined in the treaty." Among the evidence of the unsuitability, unlawfulness, and cunning stylization and contents of the treaty, they also include an article by Prime Minister Meciar (in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA of 15 May 1995) in which there is a "paradoxical statement that 1201 [Council of Europe resolution on minority rights] remains bilaterally valid for us, although the Council of Europe's Council of Ministers rejects this 1201 as invalid for the European states." In Part B, the authors refer to the consequences of ratification for the state and people. According to them, by this, the Slovak Republic would send the world a signal that the government and parliament have agreed voluntarily and willfully (at variance with the judgment of the people) with gross interference in the state's sovereignty. It says literally in point B/7: "The Hungarian side will fulfill quickly and intensively its anti-Slovak programs and aims such as the Carpathian Euroregion, territorial-administrative division in line with the views of the Hungarians, and so on." It continues in point B/8: "The organized strategies of the Hungarians to create autonomy for the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia will end, for them, with the achievement of their aims and, for us, with the loss of our southern territory along with key enterprises (Gabcikovo Water Project, Komarno Shipyards, East Slovak Iron Works Kosice, Mochovce, Sala Chemical Plants)." The authors envisage at the end of this process the collapse of the Slovak Republic's integrity, the dissolution of the independent state unit, and—conceivably—its transformation into a protectorate unit with a puppet government. "Hungarian political forces are now proclaiming civil disobedience aimed at breaking up the Slovak Republic," says the text. In the third part, the authors appeal to deputies not to sign the treaty, on the contrary, "to demonstrate their own sovereignty as deputies and vote against it." They concede as a possible alternative "removing the whole of Recommendation 1201 from the treaty and replacing it with the principles of equality and reciprocity." In this event, they would agree with continuing the talks with Hungary. The whole text is concluded with this rider:

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"For all of this, it is necessary to restore speedily republic order in southern Slovakia—that is, the regular working of the state administration and the courts—and to prevent the menacing manifestation of civil disobedience on the part of the Hungarian minority."

President Accused of Creating 'Power Center'

AU1612154195 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Dec 95 p 3

[Commentary by Viera Urbanova: "The Constructive Efforts of the Castle Lords"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The parliamentary form of government in the majority of postcommunist countries is accompanied by similar—developmental—problems. Heads of state try to interfere in policy more than the constitution allows them. While political disputes in the Czech lands or Hungary are held only in the domestic arena and national interests prevail abroad, the situation in Slovakia is unique. President Kovac is constructing a second power center and, in close cooperation with the opposition, is conducting his own foreign policy based on the systematic erosion of the image of Prime Minister Meciar's government. Despite the fact that, according to the Slovak Constitution, the government is the highest body of executive power, Michal Kovac is playing at being a strong president. He interferes incompetently in domestic political events, while he has not once made use of his constitutional right to attend government sessions (although he received an invitation from the government).

The head of state went so far last year in his attempt to keep the Moravcik coalition grouping at the helm that, on the eve of the launch of the election campaign, he influenced the voters unfairly. Following the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's [HZDS] election victory, the president even considered the possibility of not entrusting Vladimir Meciar with forming the new government. People waited to see whether, given the formation of the HZDS-Farmers' Party of Slovakia-Slovak National Party-Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] coalition government, Michal Kovac would use his supra-constitutional authority (three Constitutional Court judges had granted it to him the year before) and refuse to sign the list of candidates for the government as a whole. The president, however, had to keep his reservations about Olga Keltosova to himself, because otherwise he would have risked a political crisis for which he would have been responsible. That is, ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak had stated clearly that he did not intend to enter into a coalition other than with the HZDS.

The government, which was not to the liking of the president or the opposition, began to function. So did the campaign against it. The tried and—in political battles—already tested president became the main instrument of this campaign. The presidential activities have brought no benefit to the Slovak Republic. Whether it involved his unseemly correspondence with W. Orme [director of the New York-based Committee for the Protection of Journalists] or his visit to the United States, President Kovac adopted the destructive and special-purpose vocabulary of the opposition, which the chairman of an opposition party may venture to use, but not the most senior representative of the state. The vote of no confidence expressed in the president by the parliamentary majority was only of a declarative nature, but had broader contexts. Transferring the power to appoint and dismiss the Slovak Information Service director from the president to the government was the logical outcome of this loss of confidence. Now that the political merry-go-round surrounding Michal K. Jr. has started to turn, it seems that castle threads and interconnections have been constructed systematically and have reached all of the decisive power centers. The organization and method of Michal K. Jr.'s kidnapping; the attitude of the president, who, by using his position, is lobbying abroad and interfering anticonstitutionally in the investigation; and the activity of the political entity [Christian Democratic Movement] that, in the past, ran the Interior Ministry, highlight to an even greater extent the dangerous behind-the-scenes maneuvering of the antigovernment circles.

The past year has shown that Michal Kovac is unable to step out of his shadow (or, may not?) and that he can be easily manipulated. The question is whether this is due to his nature, the environment, or something else in the life of the Slovak president.

In any case, however, the head of state has not fulfilled his favorite words about political, national, and civic conciliation.

Kidnapping Seen as Conspiracy Against Meciar

AU1612152695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 12, 13, and 14 December, on page 4 in each instance, publishes three installments of a 3,500-word article by Jan Cavoj entitled "Abduction..., Abduction?" The article, which is intended as a response to "Peter Toth's SME series about Oskar F." (former Slovak Information Service [SIS] agent who had confessed his part in the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr.), alleges that the abduction of the president's son had been "staged" with the aim of toppling Prime Minister Meciar's government.

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In the first installment, Cavoj qualifies Peter Toth's SME series, in which Oskar F. disclosed details on the planning and realization of the kidnapping by the SIS, as "an unbelievable mixture of lies and insults" and voices the conviction that Toth's version will "collapse like a house of cards."

Cavoj also presents his own "hypothesis" on the true background and motives of what he calls Michal Kovac Jr.'s "relocation to Austria." According to this "hypothesis," which Cavoj says is "based on logic," and which he also sees confirmed by Toth's series, "the operation was part of a shrewd plan, devised by professionals, which pursued several aims." The "chief aim was to discredit the government and, above all, its prime minister," Cavoj says. The second aim was to "improve the situation of the president's son, which is incomparably better today than it was before the alleged abduction." As Cavoj points out, Kovac Jr. has been released on bail and "can do, undisturbed, everything to cover the tracks." The third aim, finally, reportedly was to "set off a hot autumn" in Slovak politics: "According to the scenario of the hot autumn, the European Union and its demarches were to play the role of nails in the coffin of Vladimir Meciar's government," he says.

Cavoj observes that, immediately after "Michal Kovac Jr.'s relocation to Austria," Jan Carnogursky, "chairman of the most aggressive opposition entity, very quickly identified the culprit." According to Cavoj, "this makes it possible to voice the hypothesis that Jan Carnogursky knew about the operation" and that he "played his own part" in it. In this context, Cavoj mentions that Peter Toth, the SME journalist investigating the case, is a "disciple of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and the son of a close female collaborator of the KDH chairman."

In the second installment of the article, Cavoj discusses the "mistakes" committed by the "professionals who staged Michal K. Jr.'s mysterious relocation to Austria" and alleged contradictions in the president son's testimony about the incident. He points out, for example, that while Michal Kovac Jr. claimed that he was made to drink by his kidnappers one and one-half liters of whiskey—which, according to Cavoj, would have been a deadly dose—four hours later Austrian doctors detected only 1.3 promille of alcohol in his blood. Similarly, Cavoj contrasts Kovac Jr.'s "horror-like" description of his injuries with his quick recovery and the fact that, a few hours after his discovery in Hainburg, near the Slovak border, he was driven to the Austrian capital in a police car, rather than in an ambulance. Cavoj also points out that "no finger or foot prints, nor any other tangible evidence" was found in Kovac Jr.'s Mercedes and observes that "the car was in the hands of the president's men for 24 hours before it was handed over to the investigator, which made it possible to remove all traces."

Cavoj voices the assumption that even Major Simunic and Major Vacok, the first two investigators of the case, were assigned their roles in the plan. According to Cavoj, "in the scenario prepared by the professionals," Jaroslav Simunic was assigned "the task to conduct the investigation in such a way as to be dismissed." Cavoj says: "From the very first day, Jaroslav Simunic was making such mistakes that, retrospectively, it is obvious that being taken off the case was his chief aim. A day or two after the start of the investigations, he declared that it was the work of the SIS. He did not have a single piece of specific evidence, only conjectures.... What professional behaves in such a way?" The second investigator, Peter Vacok, too, "behaved in a peculiar way," according to Cavoj, who mentions the investigator's alleged visits to the president's office and his accusation of the prime minister's interference in investigation of the case. Thanks to Michal Kovac Jr.'s father, Cavoj says, the investigators' dismissal got into the foreign press and, eventually, into the European Parliament resolution, which set off Slovakia's "hot autumn."

In the third installment, Cavoj reiterates that the aim of "operation Kovac Jr." was to "set in motion" the scenario of the "hot autumn" and that part of this scenario were the EU's demarches, which "were to play the role of nails in the coffin of Vladimir Meciar's government." Cavoj voices satisfaction with the fact that "the intention to overthrow the government under international pressure did not come off" but warns that "the tireless planners have not given up" their intention. He concedes possible participation by SIS members in the operation, saying that "it cannot be ruled out that some SIS employees, installed by the SIS's previous bosses, participated, without the headquarters' knowledge, in the realization of the plan of Michal K. Jr.'s relocation abroad." In this context Cavoj criticizes President Kovac's decision to grant amnesty to ex-SIS member Oskar F., charging that the amnesty's aim is to "prevent the uncovering of the lies piled up" by Oskar F.

In conclusion, Cavoj voices the conviction that, despite the president's obstructions, the case will be truthfully investigated.

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Former Investigator Reprimanded

AU1812130995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by TASR: "Peter Vacok Reprimanded and Meted Out Disciplinary Punishment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Jan Kostov, LLD, director of the Police Corps Section of Investigations and Criminal Expert Analyses, delivered to Jozef Satek, LLD, director of the Bratislava Regional Office of Investigations, and Peter Vacok, LLD, investigator with the Bratislava Regional Office of Investigations, an order at the beginning of December, in which he reduced their personal performance-related financial premium. This measure is connected with their conduct of the investigation of the criminal act of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction abroad. In addition, investigator Peter Vacok was also meted out a disciplinary punishment—a written reprimand.

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Serb Leaders on Bosnian Serb TV 'Special Program'

Karadzic: Struggle for Sarajevo

LD1612084295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0212 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Dec (SRNA) — Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, said this evening that the Serb Republic accepts the peace agreement signed in Paris yesterday and will implement it in keeping with the signed documents. However, he intimated that further political struggles lay ahead in order to improve the position of the Serb Republic, especially the Sarajevo area.

In a special program on Bosnian Serb television, commenting on the results of the Paris conference and the negotiations in Dayton, the president of the Serb Republic said that the most important result has nevertheless been achieved, namely the recognition of the Serb Republic as a state.

"It is difficult to be satisfied in view of the number of people killed and the many lost towns," Dr. Karadzic said, stressing that the territorial issue has been settled in the worst way, especially with regard to the Sarajevo area, and that the question of an outlet to the sea for the Serb Republic and many other important issues for the survival of the Serb Republic as a state have also been very poorly resolved.

"If we succeed in overcoming the problem of Sarajevo, we can say that we have achieved an epoch-making result," the president of the Serb Republic said.

Intimating that there would be a further political struggle for Serb Sarajevo, Dr. Karadzic said the international community must face up to the clearly expressed desire of the people to remain in their own city, but also to the fact that the Serbs do not want to be governed by Muslims.

According to him, there are two ways of resolving this problem: The Serbs could remain in Sarajevo and retain their own authorities, or a new city could gradually be built for them.

The president of the Serb Republic said the state leadership will fight to see this problem resolved in the best way, and he stressed that the priority is to ensure that Sarajevo Serbs remain within the Serb Republic.

Koljevic: Heed Sarajevo Referendum

LD1612100195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0212 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Dec (SRNA) — Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, warned this evening that "unless the issue of Serb Sarajevo is resolved urgently, the Dayton Agreement, which was signed in Paris yesterday, does not stand a chance.

"In Paris we had talks with members of Bildt's special commission for Sarajevo on the implementation of that part of the agreement relating to Sarajevo," Koljevic said in a special program on [Bosnian] Serb television.

He said that a compromise has to be reached for this town "which takes account of the wishes of the Sarajevo Serbs as expressed in the recently held referendum."

The vice president of the Serb Republic said the signed agreement has brought to an end the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and recognizes the priority that no one should dominate the Serbs, as was the case immediately prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

Speaking about the division of territory between the warring parties, Professor Koljevic said a joint commission, assisted by mediators, will remove any confusion over the maps.

Krajisnik: Sarajevo Key to Peace

LD1612100395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0212 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Dec, (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic, said this evening [15 December] that the Serb side "could be satisfied" with the results of the Dayton negotiations regulating the conflict in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that "there is bitterness at not being able to achieve more."

"This relates, above all, to the unfavorable solutions for Serb Sarajevo, the Posavina corridor, and the Serb Republic's outlet to the sea," Speaker Krajisnik said in a special program on Bosnian Serb television devoted to the Paris conference on the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The speaker warned that minor changes must be made to some parts of the maps of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he expressed the conviction that this could lead to a reduction in tension, especially in the Sarajevo area.

"Sarajevo is the key to war or peace, and it cannot be handed over to the Muslims without a practical solution, one which would require political and personal security for the Serb population," speaker Krajisnik said. He stressed that "it is better for Sarajevo to be transformed rather than a new solution is sought through conflict."

Speaker Krajisnik concluded that imposed solutions are, as a rule, short-lived, and as a result all three sides

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should sit down and reach agreement on contentious issues so that the peace signed in Paris might be a lasting peace.

Bosnian Serb Republic Assembly Holds 56th Session

Koljevic on Status of Serb Sarajevo

LD1712150195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1417 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — Speaking about the peace conferences in London and Paris at the 56th session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, stressed that the participants in these meetings had understood that more work is needed on the issue of Serb Sarajevo, in the light of the Dayton agreement.

Koljevic reminded the deputies that the London conference dealt exclusively with the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and that all countries that took part in the London conference assumed the obligation to provide financial assistance for the reconstruction of both entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to the Serb Republic vice president, the second aspect of the London conference was that the Dayton agreement was not to be changed.

"[Word indistinct] the peace conferences in Paris and London, it is clear that more work needs to be done on the issue of the status of Serb Sarajevo," Koljevic stressed, and added that, in line with that, a special team headed by Carl Bildt and Bildt's special delegation, which will work on the implementation of the Dayton agreement in Sarajevo, had been set up at the London conference.

The Serb Republic vice president informed the deputies that Bildt's team, headed by Michael Steiner, was told at meetings held over the past two days that the people in Serb Sarajevo had the right to choose whether to stay until a new city is built, or to leave.

Koljevic said that the departure of the Serb army and the continued presence of the police force in the period of 45 days was also discussed with Steiner and his aides. It was stressed during these meetings that the extension of the deadline for the implementation of the agreement was under the competence of U.S. General George Joulwan.

During his report, the Serb Republic vice president told the People's Assembly deputies that one of the options discussed with Bildt's team was local self-government in Serb Sarajevo.

After Koljevic's report, the 56th session of the Serb Republic parliament continued with a report by member of the Serb Republic negotiating delegation, Vladimir Lukic, after which a debate is expected to begin.

Deputies Want Milosevic To Explain

LD1712153495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1417 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — After reports on the peace conferences in Dayton, London, and Paris submitted by the members of the Serb Republic negotiating delegation, Nikola Koljevic [Serb Republic vice president] and Vladimir Lukic, the 56th session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly resumed with a debate during which Koljevic answered some deputies' questions.

A deputy from Trebinje, Mirko Mijatovic, suggested that experts from the areas where the demarcation is controversial should be consulted about possible corrections to the maps. A deputy from Serb Sarajevo, Ljubo Bosiljcic, voiced a series of objections to the solution for the status of Sarajevo.

Bosiljcic suggested that the Serb Republic president's office should move to Serb Sarajevo to appease people who, as he said, deserve full protection.

"Even if it had been at the cost of suspending the negotiations, Serb Sarajevo should not have been given to the Croat-Muslim federation," Bosiljcic stressed, and added that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who initialed the Dayton agreement, should have submitted a report to the session.

Answering the deputies' question, the Serb Republic vice president explained that he had invited Milosevic to attent today's session without consulting the assembly, but that the Serbian president could not accept the invitation. But, according to Koljevic, he expressed readiness to accept a delegation of the Serb Republic's people's deputies.

The Serb Republic vice president asked the assembly to appoint a delegation of the people's deputies which would hold talks with the Serbian president.

According to Koljevic, the sanctions against the Serb Republic should be lifted when IFOR [Impementation Force] deploys on the borders of the two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in other words, in around 30 days.

The Serb Republic assembly session continued to debate the Dayton agreement.

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Serb Territory 'Less Than 49 Percent'

LD1712162995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1417 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — Dr. Vladimir Lukic, member of the team of experts responsible for the territorial division in the delegation of the Serb Republic [RS] at the negotiations in Dayton, confirmed today that changes had been made to the map of territorial division following the Dayton conference, and that the Serb Republic's territory now amounted to less than 49 percent of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Speaking at the 56th session of the RS People's Assembly on Mt. Jahorina, Dr. Lukic said that the "territory now amounts to 48.67 and not 49 percent of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

According to Lukic, the borders have been shifted for the benefit of the Federation near Gradacac and Vukosavlje [Odzak], near Samac, on Mt. Jahorina and in southwest Sarajevo, where the Famos motor manufacturer [of Hrasnica] has been given to the Muslims.

"The demarcation line cuts through Trnovo; the Federation has been given the most fertile part of Popovo Polje [Popovo valley north of Dubrovnik]. This means that the Ljubinje-Trebinje road has been cut," Lukic said, in reference to the changes made after the Dayton conference and detrimental to the RS interests.

Lukic said that in Paris changes had been made to the map near Gradacac, and that there still existed the possibility of changing the territorial division maps. He said he had written to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who signed the Dayton accord on behalf of the Serbs, with this request.

'Precise Stance' on Sarajevo Urged

LD1712164295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1522 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — During the debate at the 56th session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, Deputy Mitar Miljanovic said that the reports submitted by the Serb Republic delegation on the peace conferences in Dayton, London, and Paris were imprecise, and he requested that the delegation should submit a written report before the next parliamentary session.

Miljanovic's request was accepted by a majority of the deputies.

Miljanovic warned that they should "get rid of illusions and verbal promises, and think seriously about how to preserve the biological presence of the Serb people in Sarajevo."

Trifko Radic, president of the Serb Sarajevo war presidency and people's deputy from Ilijas, demanded that the Serb Republic delegation explain how it could sign the Dayton agreement without consulting the Serb Republic assembly, as at its previous session the deputies had passed a decision that only they could accept or reject the solutions offered.

Radic suggested that the Serb Republic assembly take a precise stance on the people living in Serb Sarajevo, Vukosavlje, and Brcko.

According to him, "the people in Serb Sarajevo have expressed a wish to stay in their homes, and the state institutions should now find an adequate solution."

"The Serb Republic must stand behind the people of Serb Sarajevo," Radic stressed, and added that the Serb Republic's state institutions — the presidency, the government and the assembly — should move their seats to Serb Sarajevo by 25 December.

Deputies Criticize Dayton Agreement

LD1712164795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1417 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — During the debate at the 56th session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, Miroslav Vjestica, a deputy from [Bosnian] Krajina, suggested to other deputies that the Dayton and Paris agreements not be accepted because "they were imposed by force and are tantamount to treason."

"I will never vote in favor of these agreements, and I hope that the Serb deputies will not accept them either," Vjestica said.

He believes that the signing of the Paris document "is tantamount to an act of capitulation and the betrayal of Vukosavlje [Odzak], Serb Sarajevo, and other parts of the Serb Republic."

Vjestica was pessimistic about a solution to the status of Brcko, as well as the corridor for Gorazde. Possible cuts through the territory of the Serb Republic near Brcko or between Sarajevo and Gorazde could, according to Vjestica, contribute to the creation of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Vojislav Maksimovic, mayor of Serb Sarajevo and chairman of the club of deputies of the Serb Democratic Party, supported Vjestica's speech by saying "this is treason, and a very cheap sell-out."

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He believes that not enough attention was paid to the problem of Sarajevo before the Dayton summit.

Maksimovic conveyed the firm readiness of the Serb Sarajevo residents not to abandon their homes and not to come under Muslim authority, as well as the Sarajevo Serbs' invitation to the institutions of the Serb Republic government and assembly to move to their city.

"We do not accept the agreement, and we will never agree with it, not only because of Serb Sarajevo, but also because of Gorazde, Brcko, and Vukosavlje," Maksimovic stressed.

Discordant Voices at Assembly Debate

LD1712165195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1522 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — The debate on some aspects of the peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina at today's session of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic was marked by discordant contributions, and varied between calls for the accord to be resolutely rejected and appeals for the "situation to be examined in a rational way."

Krajina Deputy Nedeljko Rasula said that the Dayton accord marks the beginning of the destruction of the Serb nation's state-building rights, and that it humiliates the Serb nation and its interests.

"The Dayton agreement deprives the Serbs of their right to self-determination,r" Rasula said, and went on to stress that no person should be allowed to ratify agreements that sanction a double genocide of the Serb people.

Vogosca Deputy Jovan Tintor asked the assembly to pass specific conclusions concerning Serb Sarajevo, Vukosavlje, Brcko, and the Posavina corridor.

He warned that the Serbs of Serb Sarajevo will not leave with only one bag in hand and that Sarajevo could become a Beirut of Europe.

"We have enough strength to survive where we belong," Tintor said.

The debate was followed by a contribution by Dr. Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the republic. This will be followed by a break.

Declaration on Status of Serb Areas

LD1712192895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — At their 56th session on Mt. Jahorina today, deputies of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS] adopted a 10-point declaration on the status of the RS areas that under the Dayton agreement will become part of the Croat-Muslim Federation. The declaration was adopted with three abstentions and three votes against. The following is the full text of the declaration:

1. While taking cognizance of the peace accord and expressing its dissatisfaction at the pressures used to impose political and territorial solutions, the People's Assembly of the RS disputes the introduction of Croat-Muslim authorities into Serb Sarajevo, Vukosavlje, and parts of Podrinje, envisaged as parts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

The democratic right to self-government in these areas must be respected. The RS maintains the right — in a peaceful way and by political means — to restore its sovereignty over the areas defined by its strategic goals and the areas that are in the hands of the other side as a result of genocide or brutal conquest made possible by the intervention of foreign powers.

2. The population of Serb Sarajevo, Vukosavlje, and the part of Podrinje are called upon to remain there, in the light of their will expressed through the referendum and through other forms of personal expression, to join their authorities, remain in their centuries-old homes, and continue their political struggle and organized actions until a just solution for their status is finally found.

The United States, the Contact Group member countries, and the entire international community are called upon to take into consideration the legitimate interests of the Serb people in the affected parts of the RS and to help in fulfilling them.

3. Citizens of the RS who reside in the parts of the RS which should go to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will retain all the rights inherent in their citizenship rights. The international community is called on to guarantee the exercise of these rights.

4. The RS denies the right of the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to instigate any criminal proceedings against members of the RS Army, members of civilian bodies of power, and other RS citizens, and hereby issues a severe warning that announcements of such actions jeopardize the peace and survival of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Union itself.

5. Regarding those citizens of the RS who are residents of the Serb municipalities which are to be ceded to the Croat-Muslim federation on the basis of the general framework agreement on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and who have decided to build a new place of residence and municipal center, the RS will secure the necessary means to achieve this with the help from the international community.

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The RS hereby pledges to exempt these Serb municipalities from paying taxes and other duties in the next five years.

6. The handover of the Serb territory in the hinterland of Dubrovnik and the yielding of the Serb right to Neum are inevitably linked with the RS's access to the sea.

7. The People's Assembly lends its full support to the leadership and denies the right of the Hague tribunal to qualify the leadership's struggle for its own people as a crime.

8. Under pressure from the international community, the Serb people in the RS will remain outside Yugoslavia but will never give up their right to a common state with the majority of the Serb nation.

9. The RS insists on international arbitration to widen the territorial link between the eastern and western parts of the country in accordance with provisions of international law.

10. This declaration come into force on the day it is adopted.

With one vote against and one abstention the People's Assembly authorized the RS state leadership to conclude an agreement with the peace forces deployed on the territory of the RS.

The Assembly unanimously adopted the outcome of the referendum in Serb Sarajevo, and recommended that the state leadership transfer certain institutions to Sarajevo to provide security for the Serb population there.

The current RS public prosecutor, Staka Gojkovic, has been appointed secretary of the RS Assembly.

The session has been adjourned until 1900.

Karadzic: Dayton Accord 'Disastrous'

LD1712195995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, said in his address at today's session of the People's Assembly that "the Dayton solutions are disastrous from the point of view of the entire Serb nation."

"Compared with the proclaimed goals, the Dayton results are disastrous because we must take into consideration the fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina, which is priceless, and which was probably sacrificed to preserve Yugoslavia's continuity," Karadzic said.

As for the interest of the Serbs living in the Serb Republic, Karadzic said that "a move has been made away from the chasm to which we had been dragged by the international community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia exerting pressure on us and through our own discord."

President Karadzic urged the lifting of the blockade on the Drina and the halting of the media propaganda that has been waged in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the Serb Republic over the past 15 months.

"Unless we establish payment transactions and normal economic cooperation with Yugoslavia we are going to experience even worse difficulties," the Serb Republic president said.

Karadzic said that the Dayton outcome could have been much better if the Serb Republic delegation had been allowed to participate on an equal footing and to have direct access to the negotiating process. He went on to refer to the problem of Serb Sarajevo.

"The status of Serb Sarajevo came as a complete surprise because it had never been mentioned before. The [Dayton] provisions for Serb Sarajevo and Vukosavlje [Odzak] have dealt a moral, geostrategic, and cultural blow to the Serb nation," Karadzic said.

The president of the Serb republic said in conclusion that now "we must have a brave heart and move on to build our state," and added that "the Sarajevo Serbs must be supported in their decision to reject Muslim authorities."

Better Than Vance-Owen Plan

LD1712213795 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Vedran Skoro] In his introductory report on the peace conferences in London and Paris at the 56th session of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic today, Dr. Nikola Koljevic, the vice president of the Serb Republic, said that the participants in these two conferences had realized that, in the light of the Dayton accord, more work was needed on the issue of Serb Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Jelena Dabarcic] Following contributions by several deputies, who disputed the peace accord signed in Dayton and Paris, the People's Assembly was addressed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, who warned that ahead was a political struggle in the time of peace that should not be expected to be any easier than the struggle at the time of war.

He singled out the demarcation of state borders and the separation from the Croat-Muslim Federation as a priority, and went on to say:

[Begin Karadzic recording] I plead with you to try and conquer your emotions, to examine and see what is it

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that we have. If at the time of the Vance-Owen plan we had been offered this solution, we would have grabbed it without hesitation. If the Contact Group plan had given us the Posavina and Brcko that we have been offered now, I have no doubt that we would have accepted it. We could not have rejected it. Perhaps, it would have been better if they had offered us the situation as it is. It is not all over; let us start with access to the sea, then Sarajevo, Gorazde, Brcko, Posavina, right up to Krajina the plan is not completed, but it is not for rejection, either, and I am confident that we will be up to even IFOR [Implementation Force]. However, to us the feeling of freedom, the feeling of sovereignty, are more important to us than material gains or even ambassadorial posts. We will not be able to avoid accepting IFOR in some parts, to have IFOR forces along the border, but we must reach an agreement on this and authorize the leadership to reach such agreements, and we must tackle each case as it arises, to decide for or against this solution.

I am confident that we can convert three-quarters of the state into four quarters. We can do it. We have more than any of the Yugoslav republics were given under the 1974 Constitution. We have the capacity to continue to sabotage their union, although that Zivanovic [Karadzic's political opponent, lecturer at Banja Luka University] has recommended that we embark on building Bosnia-Herzegovina in a sincere way. We must explain to our people who is for building Bosnia sincerely and who is for building the Serb Republic. [end recording]

[Dabarcic] Following a long debate on the report submitted by the Paris and London negotiating team, deputies of the People's Assembly verified [verifikovati] the agreement with a great deal of dissatisfaction, and a request that its text should be forwarded to the deputies at the next session of the People's Assembly.

They also adopted a decision to lend their support to the Serb population in Serb Sarajevo, who had voiced their opinion in a democratic way not to accept that part of the peace agreement according to which the municipalities of Serb Sarajevo should go to the Croat-Muslim Federation, and noted that an adequate solution for them should be found. The deputies of the People's Assembly gave their consent to the state leadership to conclude an agreement with IFOR on their accommodation in parts of our republic. [passage omitted]

Adopts Decision on NATO Deployment

LD1712232895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2228 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — The People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic adopted a decision on the accommodation of peacekeeping forces on the territory of the Serb Republic.

"In order to contribute to the peace achieved between the warring sides in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic gives its consent to the state leadership to reach an agreement on the accommodation of the peacekeeping troops on the territory of the Serb Republic with their representatives."

According to the decision "it is the state's responsibility to secure an agreement that will protect the people, property, and sovereignty of the Serb Republic."

The state leadership will subsequently inform the People's Assembly about the agreement reached with the peacekeeping forces.

Rajko Kasagic Elected Prime Minister

LD1712235295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2318 GMT 17 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Dec (SRNA) — At the 56th session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly in Jahorina this evening, Rajko Kasagic was elected prime minister with only one abstention.

His list of cabinet ministers was unanimously endorsed, as follows:.

Miroslav Vjestica was elected deputy prime minister for internal policy.

Velibor Ostojic was elected deputy prime minister for social affairs.

Milomir Draganic was elected deputy prime minister for economy and finances.

From the outgoing government Kasagic kept the following:

Marko Arsovic as minister of justice;

Nedeljko Lajic as minister of traffic and communications;

Dragan Kalinic as minister of health;

Vojislav Radiskovic as minister for veterans' issues;

Milan Ninkovic as minister of defense;

Dragan Davidovic as minister of religious affairs;

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and Aleksa Buha as minister of foreign affairs.

Dragan Kijac was elected minister of internal affairs.

Dragan Bozanic was elected minister of information.

Novak Kondic was elected minister of finances.

Milorad Skoko was elected minister of industry and energy.

Spasoje Albijanic was elected minister of trade and provisioning.

Djojo Arsenovic was elected minister of agriculture, forestry, and water resources.

Ratko Misanovic was elected minister of town planning and civil engineering.

Nedeljko Rasula was elected minister of education, science, and culture.

Ljubisa Vladusic was elected minister for refugees and displaced persons.

The new prime minister thanked the deputies for their votes and confidence.

Plavsic Interviewed on Peace, Serbs' Status

AU1812123495 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 95 pp 18-21

[Interview with Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, by Jasna Jakovljevic; place and date not given: "It Was Perhaps Not Possible To Make Anything Better"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Jakovljevic] Can it be claimed that a minimum for Serbian interests has been achieved in Dayton?

[Plavsic] We formulated the minimum of our interests in two documents that were signed already in September. One of them was published, and the other one, which precisely defined our territorial priorities, has remained secret. This document obliged all signatories to implement it. According to the information I have, only the priority that the Serbs should retain their part of Sarajevo has not been implemented and respected. If there is also an agreement about Prevlaka — which has, admittedly, not been officially confirmed yet — it could be said that we have also reached an access to the sea. Posavina was also one of the priorities, and we should have insisted on a broader corridor, as in places it is only 8 km wide. I would like to remind you that it was said that the agreement would probably be elaborated in Paris, before the signing ceremony. I think that for the sake of a healthy atmosphere, which should develop, the separation of the two sides in Sarajevo should be insisted on, at least at the beginning. The Serbian population of Sarajevo — which has been exposed to the most horrible Muslim, NATO, and Rapid Reaction Force attacks since April 1992 — has morally obliged us to do that. There have been innumerable victims. Many of the Sarajevo Serbs are refugees from other parts of Sarajevo and neighboring villages; many of them were in Muslim camps. It should not be forgotten that since the outbreak of the conflict over 10,000 Serbs have disappeared in Sarajevo. I am afraid that Sarajevo could become a new hotbed. I consider it a bad intention of the peace talks organizers that they can provoke a new conflict at any moment if they need it. As both rights and morality have been violated in these talks, the outcome is like this. Naturally, not everything could have fit into 49 percent. It was perhaps not possible to achieve anything better.

[Jakovljevic] It is claimed that the official Pale policy, the lack of cooperation with the mediators, has affected the [Serbian] negotiating positions.

[Plavsic] Whenever I am asked such a question, I feel like quoting a member of the parliament, who told me in connection with the struggle of the Serbian people: "You are solving your national problem with a big delay, but this is happening in a time extremely unfavorable for you, as there is a political mafia on the international political scene." [passage omitted]

[Jakovljevic] During the negotiations, Karadzic and Mladic were charged with new crimes, and by signing the agreement all three sides agreed to the cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal. Is it possible that NATO forces, for example, could arrest President Karadzic and General Mladic after the implementation of the agreement has started, as according to the agreement they would not be protected by their political functions?

[Plavsic] I think that this simply cannot happen. In all its activities the Hague Court has so far violated justice and truth. Already in the first accusations they started creating the atmosphere in which persons charged with crimes were already declared guilty. The manipulation with indictments against President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic as if they had already been sentenced, and their use as additional pressure on the Serbian delegation, is nonsense. It is nonsense to indict them, too. Alija Izetbegovic and his people, who were charged by international experts with committing crimes against their own people — I am thinking of the "Markale 1 and 2" cases, which they made in order to achieve a media effect — have not been indicted. One should ask oneself that if Izetbegovic had been ready to do this to his own people, what would he have done to us? —

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and he did harm us very much. All this was conceived in order to annul the genocide committed against the Serbs in 1941 and in this war, which was made by Croatia. These accusations have the purpose of blaming the Serbs; they should be tried as a genocidal nation.

[Jakovljevic] How will the decision about Karadzic's and Mladic's resignation from their positions be implemented?

[Plavsic] We elected President Karadzic according to all constitutional principles, and I am afraid that there will be problems with the implementation of that decision. I cannot understand why the United States of America gets so brutally involved into our internal affairs and dictates to our people who should be their president. As you know, these are the two most prominent personalities who have since the beginning had the vision we — the Serbian people in the Serbian Republic — have followed. It has led us to the achievement of the priority aim, which is to secede from those who committed three genocides against our people in less than 100 years. We have to give Mr. Karadzic credit for this. I do not know what they want to achieve by removing Mladic. He has performed his military duty and is respected by everybody. He is a legend. They are attacking the two persons who are synonymous with Serbian culture in the Serbian Republic. This will really be difficult. Our people sympathize with people who are attacked without any reasons, they can assess the injustice done to somebody else. The Serbian people know that the innocent have been accused, that they have been indicted for the whole people. Because of all these events, Karadzic's and Mladic's rating is growing, and everything speaks in favor of the fact that the people will insist on justice. [passage omitted]

[Jakovljevic] According to some information and according to his prominence in Serbian media, many people see Professor Koljevic as Karadzic's replacement.

[Plavsic] Regarding media, I can only say there are people who like to be present in the media. Professor Koljevic knows that this election mechanism functions excellently in our country. He is well acquainted with it and he knows that the Parliament is decisive. I do not believe that something could be imposed from outside. [passage omitted]

[Jakovljevic] Have relations with Belgrade been normalized?

[Plavsic] Yes, and I am sincerely happy about it. The improvement of these relations has been a priority for all of us, because if our enemies want to split us, it is clear that a split is nothing good. Still, there are big differences, because the people of the Serbian Republic want to merge with their home country, and there is no real support for such an idea in Belgrade. It seems to me that this political orientation is too cosmopolitan. I do support cosmopolitanism, and I am cosmopolitan myself according to my profession, but I think that we first of all have to organize a strong national state like the Italians or the English have, and then we can discuss cosmopolitanism.

[Jakovljevic] Profiting from the war situation and profiteers in the Serbian Republic is a topic increasingly prominent in the media....

[Plavsic] Unfortunately, this is the reality. Many people have become rich, and I can tell you that now when Banja Luka is full of refugees, the homeless, the poor, and the hungry, when the humanitarian situation in the whole of the Serbian Republic is dramatically difficult, I am disgusted by this phenomenon. Something must be done against it. I do not know how the people who became rich on the suffering of others feel. I do not understand it. I cannot relate to the people who live in that way. If I have to, it is a sacrifice for me, these contacts remain at the official level only. You know, I have heard many stories about the sacrifices made for the Serbian people by certain people who wanted to help them, but the truth is very often completely different. These people have usually accumulated considerable wealth. [passage omitted]

[Jakovljevic] Does the Union have a future?

[Plavsic] The secession has been made, and now we have to get used to living next to each other without weapons. I think that the Croats and the Muslims will try to achieve full domination. It is worth a trial, however; the Serbian Democratic Party must elect strong personalities who will be ready to participate in the work of the Union, the Presidency, and other bodies. These must be people who will fight for the equal position of the Serbs in all bodries. Naturally, the beginning will be especially difficult. The Union is an artificial construction, and it can hardly be expected that it will last for a long time, but time will tell. Also Alija Izetbegovic knows this; it is his turn now, he has to address the people now whom he has promised the unitary Bosnia.

[Jakovljevic] Will you participate in the elections?

[Plavsic] Participation in politics has been a sacrifice for me, but I think that it was worth doing it. I think that the achieved peace and the materialization of the interests of our people deserve that one sacrifices himself also under the new circumstances.

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Deputy Foreign Minister Opposes Integral State

AU1512160095 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Dec 95 p 48

[Interview with Vladislav Pogarcic, ethnic Croat deputy foreign minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Veso Vegar; place and date not given: "An Integral Bosnia Is the Least Desirable Solution for Everybody — If People Want it, it Will Be Divided!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladislav Pogarcic, deputy foreign minister of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, told SLOBODNA DALMACIJA immediately before the peace negotiations started in Dayton that the Muslims and the Serbs were going to the negotiations with their maximal platforms and that, if they persisted with them, the negotiations were condemned to fail before they began. On that, two weeks after the signing of the peace deal in Dayton, Pogarcic says this:

[Pogarcic] Although one would really like to, it is impossible to find the basic assumptions underlying those negotiating platforms. The future will show how the Serb and Muslim public will react in the long term to such behavior by their leaders.

[Vegar] Has the Croatian public already judged the agreement as unjust?

[Pogarcic] The discussion on the justice and injustice of the peace agreement is only an indicator of the maintenance of the mental state created among the people of this area by half a century of communist power. One can discuss whether the agreement is favorable or unfavorable for any side, but, just like most things in politics, it cannot be either "just" or "unjust," because politics neither knows nor recognizes such categories. Such categories were introduced into politics by the communists, who claimed that they were creating "a just system," though it is well known how just that system was.

[Vegar] Is the Dayton agreement favorable or unfavorable for the Croatian nation, then?

[Pogarcic] In terms of the overall Croatian interest, it is exceptionally favorable, because it creates the preconditions for the final establishment of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and formally defines Croatian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everybody who doubts such an interpretation should remember the situation in 1992, when the war in Bosnia formally started. The Republic of Croatia was, at that time, reduced to two-thirds of its territory, and the Croatian representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to put his signature to a plan in Lisbon that gave only 12 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Croats. And now, in November 1995, Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman is signing a peace agreement on the conditions for a peaceful reintegration of the remaining just over 4 percent of the territory and a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the other hand, in terms of regional Croatian interests, for example, those of the Croats from Bosanska Posavina, the agreement is truly particularly unfavorable. One should notice that the agreement is not the result of the victory of one side or the capitulation of the other, in which case the victorious side could obtain the maximum of its interests. As this peace is the result of "the war without a winner" and thus the result of compromises, accompanied by immense pressure from what we call international factors, on each side there must be some interests not realized.

[Vegar] Speaking of the pressures imposed by international factors, how would you comment on the view that the Croatian president made concessions under pressure from U.S. President Clinton, although it is commonly believed that relations between Croatia and the United States are very good?

[Pogarcic] In international relations, things are far from being simple and able to be interpreted in terms of black and white. Some influential circles in the West have been accusing Croatian nationalism of being the main culprit for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the process of having Croatia accepted as an equal member of the international community is not yet over. Moreover, in international relations, the advocates of a need for the revival of some kind of Yugoslavia are still relatively loud. Of course, any revival of Yugoslavia, in line with these ideas, is possible only if Croatia grows weaker. So, neither U.S. policy nor the President himself are immune to such pressures. On the other hand, the U.S. Administration has convinced itself that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was the result of Serbian political will. The U.S. Administration knows very well who started the policy of "ethnic cleansing" and who committed the terrible mass murders on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Finally, the third factor determining the coordinates of U.S. policy in this region is pressure from the Islamic countries, directed particularly toward preserving the Muslim factor. The result of the lines of force defined in this way is U.S. policy toward Croatia, in which both good cooperation and even support for Croatia are possible, but also pressures directed at softening some Croatian demands.

[Vegar] Some people say that an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved by the formula "the whole of Bosnia made up of two parts," while others

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talk about a division into two? Which group has the better arguments?

[Pogarcic] Bosnia-Herzegovina has neither been divided nor reintegrated by the peace agreement. Some people say that the solution is paradoxical. Such a peace, it is true, is not a final solution because one cannot find a final solution for the problems that are tearing Bosnia-Herzegovina apart. So, whether Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided or remains whole depends exclusively upon the will of its population. If the population wants Bosnia, it will live as a whole; if the population does not want it, it must be divided. The peace agreement only provides the conditions in which both exits will be available and this exclusively by peaceful means.

[Vegar] Do you really think that the peaceful division of Bosnia is possible?

[Pogarcic] Yes. In fact, that possibility is the only clear result of these four years of war. Remember how Bosnia was described at the beginning of the war, as a "leopard skin." Today, however, it is a country of three ethnic communities, each having its own strictly delineated territory. This might be thought to be ugly, there are people who are even disgusted by this, but they should know that it is the result of the will of the population itself. The Serbs, Muslims, and Croats have ethnically cleansed territories wherever they could (meanwhile, it must not be forgotten that the Pandora's Box of ethnic cleansing was forced open by the Serbs, although the two other nations could not resist the temptation to take a look into it), until they reduced the members of the other ethnic communities to 10 percent or less of the total. With 10 percent or less of the total, one cannot threaten the political position of the majority, while simultaneously the minority functions as an ornament and can even serve as proof of the will to create a "multiethnic society." In western Europe, too, which is disgusted by everything that has been happening in these territories and often lectures on the necessity of multiethnic societies, nobody allows uncontrolled migration or the excessive growth of those who are ethnically, culturally, or in any other way different from the majority population. But that is achieved, of course, by far less brutal methods than those that have been used, particularly by the Serbs, in this war.

[Vegar] What is the attitude of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In other words, is there any chance that Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive as a whole country?

[Pogarcic] It is really awkward to predict whether Bosnia will survive as one whole or will be divided, but it is nevertheless possible to analyze the current situation from the acts and statements of politicians. Regarding the will to maintain Bosnia, it is only possible to say that today it is on all sides the least desired solution. When I say that, I am thinking of a whole Bosnia of three constituent nations, and not of some kind of authoritarian position of any of the internal factors as advocated by the authorities in Sarajevo, which openly and persistently repeat their declaration on an "undivided Bosnia." The way in which the Muslim political leadership sees that Bosnia-Herzegovina as their own has clearly been shown in the case of the setting up of the so-called War Presidency of the Municipality of Neum, as well as the adoption of the anthem of "the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" by the Sarajevo authorities (in a situation where we already have signed an agreement to abolish "the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" and to found the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which requires the general consensus of the legitimate representatives of all three nations on such important issues). And while on the Muslim side, one can notice an essential difference between their public declarations and real acts, for the time being there are no doubts at all about the Serb side: They want to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina at all costs.

[Vegar] What about the Croats?

[Pogarcic] The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have their interests and objectives, which have been known and made public since "The Livno Question" up to the meeting and congress "The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina — Objectives and Possibilities." However, at the same time, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of their small number, cannot be such an active factor as to direct the development actively and immediately. It is very easy to explain what this is all about. If the Serbs and the Muslims wanted the survival of Bosnia as an united state, the Croats would not be able to oppose it. However, if the Serbs do not want Bosnia and the Muslims and the Croats do, the situation is essentially different, because how can a country survive when a third of its population does not want it, to such an extent that they are ready to resist the very idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina by taking up arms? Only by reducing that 33 percent to under 20 percent. The Muslim political leadership probably hoped for that at the beginning of the war, and it might still be hoping for it today, that it would be possible after the withdrawal of the NATO troops, when their mandate expires. However, such an enterprise is unrealistic as long as there is Serbia. On the other hand, a Bosnia-Herzegovina without the Serbs is not much of a Bosnia-Herzegovina, and requires completely new solutions to mutual relations.

[Vegar] So what should the Croats do?

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[Pogarcic] The Croats should in peacetime preserve everything that they defended by arms in the war. It is, above all, possible by organizing as quickly and efficiently as possible of the Croatian authorities in the cantons and the municipalities in line with the Constitution and the laws of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The orientation of these new authorities should be the prevention of negative demographic trends and the creation of conditions in which Croats, where they are today, have all the conditions for decent lives. These Croatian authorities have to make sure that at least, such as in Tomislavgrad, the Croatian population does not continue to decrease as was the case during the communist power. In achieving these objectives, it is essential to rely on assistance from the Republic of Croatia, since the very same interests are being jeopardized that were jeopardized in the war. And, finally, as President Tudjman has skillfully plotted a course for the Croatian warship between the Serb Scylla and the Muslim Charybdis, and kept it afloat, though buffeted by western and eastern winds, one should believe that the Croatian ship will sail in much safer waters in peace.

Serb General Views 'Scheming' Against Army

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[Interview with Milan Gvero, deputy commander of the Pale Serb military, by Slavica Jovovic, in Banja Luka; date not given: "Peace Has Caught Us by Surprise"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Tito's Vet

[Jovovic] How do you explain some of the latest decisions of President Karadzic on personnel changes in the army leadership, which you have not accepted?

[Gvero] It is somewhat inappropriate for me to talk about it, because part of it concerns me personally, but there is nothing I have to hide or say. I believe that there has been a negative attitude towards the army leadership and officers as professionals ever since the beginning of the war. In the interest of the unity of the state leadership before the people, we have managed to overcome -that to a a great extent to our own disadvantage. There was the widespread conviction that these officers can never be real Serbs, that they are communists, that they are Tito's officers. No one has ever asked whether they would be officers at all had they not been officers in that former army. Where could any of us have obtained experience and education as officers if not in that army and that society? And, after all, the criticisms addressed to the army in that way are unfair. Could one not say the same about others who were educated at that time, that they were, for example, Tito's vets or Tito's psychiatrists, economists, ironmongers, and so on? In this war, these officers could have avoided war more easily than others who escaped when the war was only at its beginning; but instead, they stayed or they came here to be a force. Second, in the whole history of warfare the largest percentage of active officers has been killed precisely in this army, compared with the overall number.

Already last year this principally negative attitude had created some individual cases, in which, for example, one general was pensioned off without any previous consultations with the head staff. That was General Djukic. But we did not allow this, as he is a member of our team, which entered this war and will take it to the end. Further, after the assembly in Sanski Most, they attempted to remove Gen. Mladic. We did not allow that, either. At the time it was said: Mladic must go, while the other generals can stay because they are good. When they saw that it could not work, they said that the others had to go and that Mladic was good so he could stay. The methods are different but the goal is the same: remove the leadership of this army to create a new political situation around the army and be able to treat the army differently. I want to point out that, regardless of all the attacks, we do not have a negative attitude toward the political leadership, but we do have to react, at least to a certain extent, in cases where there are completely invented, unfair attacks on individuals and the army as a whole. Neither I nor my colleagues came here because somebody forced us to or ordered us to; instead we came out of our own will, and we want to contribute to the solution of the situation as much as we can. Personally, I believe that once peace is signed I will say thank you, I have finished my part of the work. Unless there are some other needs.

[Jovovic] Has peace not been signed, then?

[Gvero] Initialed.

[Jovovic] How was that signature or initials on the Dayton agreement received in the army and in its leadership?

[Gvero] We are trying to make our evaluations as responsible and as factually based as possible. As the head staff, we have still not been in a situation to have all the papers before us and to analyze them as the head staff. That is why I could not, and would not want to, give any evaluations at this moment, but I can convey to you some of the impressions and my personal attitude. At the moment of the initialing of the long-awaited peace agreement, the majority of our units and the enemy's units on the front lines reacted to it by

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firing into the air as a sign of approval. Those were the first impressions, the first images.

Problematic Moments

[Jovovic] Is the biggest achievement of the agreement peace?

[Gvero] The signing, or rather the initialing, of that agreement has been a compromise, so that some of the solutions are really not the way we had for a long time expected them to be; there are some people who look at this as though we were alone in the world and on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as though we alone were the ones to decide what would happen and how, as though there were no enemy, as though there were no powerful international community led by the United States, and various lobbies, which even before the war and particularly in the course of the war have shown that they are against us. Under such conditions we have to view what has been signed realistically. It is obvious that there are many things there that are not in our interest in the long run. But also, it is a fact that bases for peace have been created and we have the Serb Republic, in one way or another, and we have conditions for the economic, scientific, cultural, and probably also state cooperation with other parts of the Serb nation. Besides, I believe that, at least for the time being, and I hope also in the long run, war in this region has ended.

The arrival of troops from other countries is probably not pleasant for anyone, for any nation or country. As for us, there are several points that are problematic; the "most Serb" part of the territory in the Bosanska Krajina has not been included in the Serb Republic, and then there is the narrow corridor, the solutions on Sarajevo, the rather wide corridor to Gorazde, then the solutions for Konjic and Mostar. Besides, there are no elements that mention access to the sea, which I hope will be solved in the context of the entire confederation. However, we have to be realistic; we have almost half the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and have relatively good and fertile land on which it will be possible, if there are some new forces and if there is enough wisdom to organize a quality, prosperous life. We have the possibility to be on our own and, which is most important, this means the end of war in this region.

The continuation of war under the conditions in which we and our enemies were of late could very easily have been such that I would not like to have made any public assessment of it.

[Jovovic] Yet it seems that most reactions have been caused by the issue of Sarajevo; is it true that Gen. Mladic "promised" that the Serb army would not leave Sarajevo?

[Gvero] I was travelling yesterday, so I was not in telephone or any other contact with Gen. Ratko Mladic, so I do not know the context of his reaction or his statement. I did listen to the speeches of President Karadzic and Krajisnik on this problem. I believe that the interest in the Sarajevo region is completely understandable. I believe that at this moment we have to see things in a much wider perspective than we have done up to now, as some individuals have done up to now. Further, we have to be realistic and must not allow ourselves to be put in the situation of being labelled the destructive factor, i.e. as the ones who are to blame for the failure of this peace process in a world full of anti-Serb electricity. If that happened, I believe that the Serb people on this side of the Drina, and the Serb people in general, would not be in a very pleasant situation.

The Privileged Interior Ministry

[Jovovic] Except for the statement that I have just mentioned, Gen. Mladic has not been appearing in public these days or during the Dayton negotiations altogether.

[Gvero] First, Mladic is happy to contact journalists. There are no significant appearances or lack of them at this particular moment; simply, he appears when he judges that there is a need for him to appear or to say something in the interest of this struggle and of this nation.

[Jovovic] How do you see the conduct of the interior ministry troops in this war, and what has been the army's relationship toward them? They seem to have been considerably better equipped than your soldiers.

[Gvero] You are picking some sensitive topics; on the other hand I do not avoid any question. I believe that it is a affair of state to develop the components of its armed forces — the police and the army — as equally as possible and in proportion with their purpose. The army is always more numerous; it is the basic defense force and the main consumer. The police are relatively less numerous, with specific tasks. In this war, our police units have always been involved in the fighting, but still it is a fact that the status of the police as professionals has probably been much better solved than that of our soldiers in terms of equipment and in many other respects. I hope and I wish to believe that there are no other intentions behind this, except that they are fewer in number, so it is easier to equip them. In any case, the members of the army, as those who in this war have made the creation of the Serb Republic possible, form the main and dominant force in this war and, as such, they are most responsible for the successful conduct of the war, and, I hope,

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conclusion. What very often irritates the members of the army is when several brigades are operating on one front, which means several thousand or even tens of thousands of army members, who, with their equipment, number, and strength, enable the maintenance of a certain direction and a certain military action, with just a few hundred policemen among them, the media then portray things the other way around and talk about that small number of people 10 times more than about everybody else. However, that has nothing to do with the police, but with those who should take care of everything that goes into the public domain and who in this war have unfortunately proved to be unprofessional and incompetent in that task.

[Jovovic] It seems that the forces of the interior ministry are closer to the political circles or to the political leadership of the Serb Republic or that the political leadership favors them more than the army.

[Gvero] It is possible to speak as you have posed your question. I want to answer that question in a responsible way. We do not want and we have no reason for a confrontation with the interior ministry or its units, nor do we want anything that would mean the creation of some sort of tension. It is a matter for the state to form its interior units as it considers desirable and necessary. What we want is for everybody to do his job.

The interior ministry and the army in wartime, as well as in the immediate post-war period and in peace, should cooperate in many fields, like institutions. Those at the head of the interior ministry and the state can change; it is the institutions that should cooperate; that is in the interest of both structures and the people. Regardless that there have been pressures on individuals from the interior ministry, for a different relationship to be created, I personally have correct communications with them, as a person and as a soldier.

Arkan and Radovan

[Jovovic] At the beginning of the war, there appeared certain formations that were often condemned for their actions and considered to be paramilitaries. On this occasion I will only mention members of the troops commanded by Zeljko Raznatovic [Arkan], who were recently officially and publicly welcomed and reviewed by the president of the Serb Republic.

[Gvero] I would not like to discuss the competences, the jurisdictions, or the decisions of the present president. For us as the army, it was important to have unity from the first day. There were numerous groups that used come here and we endeavored energetically not to have any incidents with them and to reduce their presence to the appropriate level. Unfortunately, there are still a considerable number of such people. At this moment I would not like to speak about Mr. Arkan. True, I have met him on our front. According to our law, everybody has the right to apply to be a volunteer and we are the ones who then approve of his participation in the fighting. That is simply a matter for the army. In the case that you mention there was no such decision.

[Jovovic] Talking to the refugees from the towns and territories that were lost this autumn, I heard that in nearly all the lost towns, several days before they "fell," President Karadzic appeared, saying that there was no chance of that town falling or that it was a centuries-old Serb town, and so on, and that immediately before or after him, particularly in some villages, some people would come in cars with improvised registration plates made of paper, on which was written VRS [army of the Serb Republic]; those people would then say: "Pack up your things, this has been lost, you had better leave...." Some people even told me that in some towns, while he [Karadzic] was making his speech, for example in Drvar, as he was saying that it was a centuries-old Serb town, that there was no chance of it falling, members of his personal security were advising the masses present, or at least people if not masses (I was not present, so I cannot talk about this with certainty) that they should pack up their things as soon as possible and go, that the place had been given away, sold, that it was all to equate those percentages for the division under which the territory under Serb control should be reduced to 49 percent.

[Gvero] I would like to ask you to note down this question of yours word for word and to consider it part of my answer. I have also heard such rumors; however, because of my self-respect and correctness I do not wish to speak publicly about something for which I have no convincing evidence. In my answer to one of your previous questions, I told you about the fall of Bosanska Krajina that probably many things happened of a dubious nature. What is true is that immediately before the fall of certain places President Karadzic had been to them. Examples? In the first offensive, Jajce, Srbobran [Donji Vakuf], and Mrkonjic Grad. However, that is still not evidence, not fact. I wish to stress that I do not want to believe that a Serb, and particularly someone in a high post, would consciously allow the enemy to destroy, kill, torture, rob, plunder, and occupy Serb territory. If such things really did happen, I assure you that they will be disclosed sooner or later. Unfortunately, for some people and some territories it is too late. Time will disclose everything; not even in the times of the most autocratic regimes, in the times of Chinese emperors, Egyptian pharaohs, in the times of Stalin, Hitler, and our pre-war times, did anything

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remain a secret, and everything was sooner or later disclosed. And now if there is such an individual or a group, they should be ashamed to be alive on this earth.

[Jovovic] In connection with that, there are some reports, though I do not know how reliable they are, that the political leadership of the Serb Republic was meeting with the Croatian authorities in Rome, Naples, and other cities in Europe and that the latest alleged agreement happened precisely here in Banja Luka at Ilinden [Serb holiday]?

[Gvero] I have not been officially informed about such contacts, but in one agitated reaction to some personal attacks I publicly requested explanations as to whether such meetings had occurred and what had been agreed at them. I addressed that question to the highest state leadership, but I have not received any answer to this day. But I have also heard that such meetings occurred. [passage omitted]

[Jovovic] How do you view the Hague Tribunal and the indictment of Gen. Mladic as a war criminal?

[Gvero] I believe that it was wrong of the international community to qualify as a criminal, in any way, a commander of a legal army, who had the exclusive and sole task of defending his people from a prepared and partially perpetrated genocide and who, according to the general belief, has done that successfully as a commander. The very establishment of the Hague Tribunal is part of the widespread anti-Serb propaganda and it was intended exclusively for Serbs. However, it seems that lately, under public pressure, they have been forced to include a few Croats and Muslims. I do not believe that there is any reason to put the president of this republic or Gen. Mladic before that Tribunal. [passage omitted]

[Jovovic] These days there have been some calculations about changes in the political and military leadership of the Serb Republic, according to which Mr. Koljevic could become the president of the republic and Gen. Gvero would replace General Mladic.

[Gvero] That possibility has never been mentioned in my presence or to me personally. Personally I believe that it comes from some schemes directed against me; they are skillful in spreading that; this was also claimed by one gentleman in a rented television program, whom I do not know. I have nothing against that gentleman, but I do not know him personally. I am sorry that he mentions me without any reason, but such things happen in times like these. I believe that it is a result of someone's well thought-out plan and someone's propaganda against our head staff and against me personally. I do not have such ambitions and I think that it is very unrealistic. I regard Gen. Mladic very highly as a colleague, as a general, and as a man.

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Tudjman Grants News Conference on Peace Accords

LD1512195395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1115 GMT 15 Dec 95

[News conference held by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb; moderator unidentified — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rajic] Mr. President, this is Zeljko Rajic, Croatian Television. I believe that this will be an opportunity for you to reply to a large number of reporters' questions about what happened in Paris yesterday. I would like to ask you for your comment on what did not happen, namely mutual recognition between Croatia and the so-called Yugoslavia. When is it going to happen, and how will it affect the Erdut agreement? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Your main question, how it will affect the agreement on peacefully reintegrating Croatia's Danube area, western Srijem, east Slavonia, and Baranja: By no means should it have negative effects, because the Serb side, headed by President Milosevic, is still of the opinion that this agreement should be implemented. In the course of the Paris talks I also had talks to the effect that the UN Security Council should make those decisions that are needed on the transitional administration and military forces that will carry out the demilitarization.

Consequently, nothing should change in this respect. All the more so as the Serbian side expressed not just a willingness to carry this out but also an interest in applying normalization to all areas. As you know, some trade agreements and contracts, etc., have already been envisaged.

The signing of the agreement on mutual recognition, on normalization of relations, did not take place because the Serbian side demanded that we should sign a bilateral agreement on Prevlaka. You know our position, and following my return from Dayton I explained the Croatian position and, understandably, on our part, the signing of the agreement could not have taken place; we could not sign anything regarding this issue. There is a proviso though, there is something new in this. As I explained in my missive and at one of my conferences, the Serb side raised its demand for Prevlaka at a time when the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of three republics, with the Serb Republic demand for access to the sea on the one hand, at a time when the Croatian Army had forced Serb and Yugoslav forces to leave the Dubrovnik hinterland on the other.

Today, however, the Serbian side is raising this demand for Prevlaka because they believe that the border lines between Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia were not drawn in a correct manner in the framework of the former Yugoslavia; so they claim that Prevlaka, for whatever reason, belongs to Boka Kotorska, and believe that we should accept such an agreement. For our part, I reiterated the ins and outs of this, and said that this had been placed on the international conference agenda and that today there are no formal, legal, or realistic possibilities of our signing such an agreement.

The Dubrovnik hinterland has been incorporated into the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. By virtue of this alone, this can no longer be a matter for negotiation. Besides, if it were a matter for negotiation it would not be of concern just to Croatia and to Yugoslavia, but to Bosnia-Herzegovina, too.

As for the borders, we clearly refuted the views that these borders were not correct or that they were to the detriment of Montenegro in the former Yugoslavia, both from Croatia's historical viewpoint — because Croatia is recognized within its internationally recognized borders — or because the international public, international factors, have recognized all the republics within the borders they had when they departed from the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we expressed our willingness to have a mixed commission established, and even an international arbitration commission, which would examine the problem of borders on land and sea and suggest solutions.

As we believe that our positions are fully justified, we even said we are willing to accept the views of such an international arbitration commission. The Serbian side did not, however, want to accept our suggestion. That is why it was not willing to sign this agreement in Paris yesterday. Nevertheless, it expressed its views as their representatives, including President Milosevic. It explicitly stated that this normalization will take place in this peace process.

[Kabok] Zoltan Kabok, Croatian Radio. Mr. President, what will happen with the agreements on establishing telecommunications links, and with the agreement that has already been signed between INA [Croatian oil company] and some of the Yugoslav oil companies in the light of the failure to sign formal recognition? Thank you.

[Tudjman] These are trade agreements, and the agreements to open up transport, telecommunications, and other road and railway links were drawn up in the expectation that the signing of the Dayton agreement in Paris will result in mutual recognition and diplomatic relations. As this has not happened, it will be quite normal to delay the implementation of these contracts until these aspects of the agreement are fulfilled. By the way, in answer to this and the other question, I can tell you

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that in the course of my bilateral talks, including those with both President Clinton and with President Chirac, I encountered understanding for the Croatian view on this.

[Freundlich] Maja Freundlich, VJESNIK. Mr. President, Butrus Butrus-Ghali has recommended a new international contingent of 11,500 troops. Your proposal was contrary to this. What you asked for is for the Russian and Belgian battalions to remain. Do you see this as an attempt to procrastinate over the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and how are you going to react? And if I may just be allowed one more question: REUTER reported yesterday about the clashes shortly after the signing ceremony in Paris yesterday, about the clashes between Islamic mujahedin and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] near Zepce. Can you comment on this?

[Tudjman] As for Butrus-Ghali's proposal, it is totally unacceptable to us. We have given instructions to our UN representatives to reject this proposal as not being conducive to the implementation of the agreement reached with the Serbs on the peaceful integration of the occupied territories in Croatia. This should happen immediately, but under the UN secretary general's proposal it would take as long as six months to assemble such a large international force, or rather special force — we still do not know what it is going to be called. That is why, even before I left for Paris, I gave instructions that the proposal be rejected as unacceptable to us. While in Paris, I spoke to Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and reiterated our standpoint. In response, he agreed that a new solution will have to be found. but said that it is not up to him but up to the UN Security Council. However, I asked U.S. representatives, including President Clinton, and they promised me, and President Clinton did personally, to do everything necessary to ensure that the United Nations and the Security Council implement what was agreed in Dayton concerning how to bring about the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into Croatia's constitutional and legal system. The name of the commanding general will probably be announced today. It will be U.S. General Joe Klein, who will head the interim U.S. administration. A solution will be found under which both the Belgian and Russian battalions — both of which have expressed readiness to enforce the agreement, if authorized — carry out demilitarization, disarm Serb paramilitaries, and if Belgrade gives instructions, which we asked for and about which Milosevic said there would be no problems, that the Serb paramilitaries would offer no resistance, then the Russians and the Belgians will be prepared to enforce the agreement.

We also put forward an additional proposal, in case more troops are needed for such a task. We suggested that they transfer the Nordic battalion from Tuzla to this area. Only a few days rather than months would be needed to accomplish this.

As for your second question, I have only just heard about it, about the clash between the mujahedin and the federal police near Zepce. Yes, this is a problem with wider implications, and the international community has become aware of it. Official U.S. circles have made a request for the withdrawal, or rather removal, of the mujahedin from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Official circles are still saying that their number is 2,000-3,000, that they are there as independent units, but that they have an influence over other units. I have not seen a military parade in Zenica recently, I do not know what it was all about, but some of you know about it, apparently there is evidence there of their influence. As I said, this is a problem with wider implications, which NATO forces will have to deal with. It seems to me, and I have heard, that President Izetbegovic and the government in Sarajevo have expressed a readiness to resolve the problem by ensuring that the mujahedin are not present in Bosnia so that they cannot thwart the peace process.

[Moderator] Mr. Saleh, your question please.

[Saleh] Mr. President, did Serbia make recognition between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conditional on the large-scale return of refugees who left during Operation Storm, and will Croatia accept such a condition if Serbia proposes it?

[Tudjman] Serbia has not laid down any conditions. And we would not accept any such conditions or their right to do this in any case. Furthermore, I believe that in the talks which have been conducted both on this and also in connection with the critical issue of the Serb population in Sarajevo, a realistic approach has been adopted, namely, that it is not realistic to expect that the majority of these refugees will return and that we should make this a matter of a voluntary return and resolve individual questions on a humanitarian basis.

[Al-Issa] Nada al-Issa, Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-Television and BH-PRESS. Mr. President, I am asking you as someone who knows the circumstances and as a participant in all these peace talks. What motivated, or perhaps to put it better, forced the Serbian president to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina at precisely this time? Does this finally mean that there will be peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina from now on?

[Tudjman] Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognized within the framework of the agreement as signed in Dayton. In other words, this is to be a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina

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made up of two entities — the Federation and the Serb Republic — and when the peace forces arrive, which as you have probably seen are arriving on the front lines. [sentence as heard] So it was in this context that Milosevic recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to achieve peace and everything which peace brings, including the lifting of sanctions and the avoidance of further war which has obviously been damaging to Serbia — and not only to Serbia but also to others. So these were the reasons why recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina came about. After all, unless this happened there would not have been a peace agreement.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] I am from China central television. Now that we have peace in this region, what do you consider to be the most serious problem in the wake of this agreement, and what do you believe the international community should do with these 60,000 NATO troops? What should they do?

[Tudjman] It is evident that the signing of the peace agreement achieved the main thing — all sides agreed to halt the war — but incidents can arise in certain circumstances. We had the example of what happened yesterday with the clash between a group of mujahedin and the police that you mentioned. Then we had some shelling or a blast in Sarajevo — I do not know what kind of thing that was. But it is to be expected that the arrival of such respectable forces — those of NATO and the United States — in Bosnia-Herzegovina will truly mean the establishment of peace, and then the further development of political relations, in which much is expected of the elections, which are due to take place, possibly, in three to six months' time. But if we look at things realistically these elections can only bring in new people as the leaders of individual ethnic communities and nations, and there will be no essential change to the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.

But apart from imposing this peace, the international community has a big role to play, and will probably also influence further developments with its program of renewal and reconstruction, which will be discussed. This has already been discussed in London, and it will be discussed further in Bonn, Stockholm, etc. There will also be attempts to bring about a military balance of forces, etc. All in all, while being very cautious and realistic, we have every reason to believe that peace can and must be preserved.

[Moderator] Yes, please, Mr. [name indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent] VECERNJI LIST. Mr. President, VECERNJI LIST has obtained information from its Sarajevo correspondent that the judicial authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have issued a warrant for the arrest of 82 Croats from the ranks of Croat military and political authorities. Could you please comment on this?

[Tudjman] Understandably such a ruling by the legislative authorities, notwithstanding full acceptance of the independence of courts, amounts to an [word indistinct] act, because on this list there are allegedly all political people, both the military and political representatives of the Croatian people from central Bosnia who defended central Bosnia, first, from Yugo-communist and Serb aggression and later from attempts by Muslim forces to take control of central Bosnia. Surely such steps are at odds with the idea of cooperation between the Bosniak and Croat people, they are at odds with creating a realistic federation, and they are at odds with the latest signing of the agreement we had already reached in Dayton, initialled and signed in Paris, on creating a joint council for cooperation between the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

This joint council — which will be comprised of 10 members, five from either side, and will be headed by a president in his capacity as president of Croatia and vice president in his capacity as president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency — should include the most responsible people of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. This joint council is tasked with harmonizing not only problems within the Federation but between Croatia and the Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole in all areas — education, science, culture, and economy, led by the ambition to create as soon as possible a single economic area, as well as in foreign policy and the military. Consequently, in all areas this council should secure this.

This is what its task is, and it will certainly yield results. In this light such steps are directly at odds with such an aspiration, which stems from both the demands and the needs of both the Croat and the Bosniak people and even the international community. This is why I believe that such misunderstandings will have to be eradicated in the interest of breathing life into the fundamental problems contained in the idea of creating a Federation and this joint council for cooperation with Croatia.

[Moderator] Here, please, Mrs. [name indistinct], go ahead.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct] for Deutsche Welle. Mr. President, Belgrade has recognized the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it can no longer offer a trade-off between Dubrovnik's hinterland and the Prevlaka promontory. What territories are being offered for trade by Belgrade at the moment? If there will be any talks in the first place on this issue, will Croatia demand the

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part of Srijem in the direction of Sid that is inhabited by Croats in return for Prevlaka?

[Tudjman] I have already answered this question. I have nothing to add to what I said. Mr. Ivkosic has been waiting here for three days.

[Moderator] I am sorry, I cannot see him, he is behind the camera.

[Ivkosic] Since you have noticed that my hand has been raised for a while I will ask you a rather unpleasant question....

[Tudjman, interrupting] If I knew it was going to be unpleasant... [laughter]

[Ivkosic] This is by and large a topical conference, but perhaps we should reflect on a plethora of interviews with party leaders and articles, etc. Almost every interview is concerned with you personally as well as with the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. For example, I read today — perhaps you have not read the entire interview, but you have seen the headline. The interview with Marko Veselica in NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA is headlined: Tudjman Should Get Rid of Chameleons and Communists in the HDZ. You have probably not managed to read this piece so far, but I believe that even the headline itself merits your comment. Thank you.

[Tudjman] Regrettably, I have no time to read news pieces anyway. Such a headline is rather surprising. First, Tudjman and the HDZ have created, together with someone and something, this independent and democratic Croatia, and even brought about a situation where in the framework of the Dayton agreements and now the Paris signatures, all serious people believe that this is Croatia's victory, that Croatia has in this way achieved all those national and state goals that it could have at this day and age. If, who was that, it was Marko Veselica who said this. If Marko Veselica said this in general terms, I can say that by no means have I achieved these goals of Croatian national and state policy together with chameleons and those communists who remain on communist positions. I have, however, been achieving this in keeping with a program of reconciliation among Croats.

Without this reconciliation, this program, which called for unity among all the Croatian people, regardless of their past, who favored an independent, sovereign, and democratic Croatia, who in effect renounce their misconceptions and even the ideals they believed in when they were young, who accept the need for unity among all social strata — and no one in the world has been as successful in this as we have, only in the Croatian national renewal movement, whereby we achieved an independent, sovereign, and democratic Croatia, only in this Croatia do we find representatives of Croatian aristocracy and Croatian intelligentsia and Croatian workers and Croatian farmers. [sentence as heard] We also find representatives of Croatia's right wing and left wing and Croatia's centrist parties. Only in this way could we achieve what we have achieved.

Veselica has probably forgotten some cases like those that I know of in Sinj, and not only in Sinj, cases of some young Croatian people in that communist era who would snatch a crucifix from the necks of Croatian girls because they went to church, expressing their belonging to Catholicism and Croatian ethnicity in this way. Moreover, in this and other towns there were such cases of religious services being disrupted, and even pigs being hurled into churches. Should I note that it was not only Serbs in Croatia but Croats, too, who used to arrest and punish Croats for displaying Croatian flags or singing Croatian songs, including even the most innocent ones, such as Vila Velebit.

Consequently, this was the situation in which the Croatian people lived, in which one part of those who stayed in Croatia got involved and even believed this was good, while others did so under duress. As we know, a large part of the Croatian people went abroad because of this. But please, facing the problem of how to get out of the communist and Yugoslav hell, we drew the conclusion that we should not raise the question of retaliation and settling scores with those who were in one way or another in the service of the enemy of Croatian freedoms, but come up with the idea of reconciliation. It was precisely this idea of reconciliation that was the basis for our creation of, as I said, an independent, sovereign, and democratic Croatia.

Understandably, in this context there are chameleons, too. In this context there are still those who have not given up their communist ideas, views, etc. It is absolutely certain, given that he mentioned Tudjman, that I in my capacity as president of Croatia and the Croatian democratic authorities, that we are doing everything to make their numbers as low as possible, to remove them from public life, to remove those who remain on their positions, those who do not give up their communist doctrines, those who want to abuse Croatian authority.

It is clear that without such constant efforts we would not have achieved those political and military successes. Moreover, ladies and gentlemen, the world has admitted that we have also performed an economic miracle in those conditions, something the world did not expect. Consequently, I do not find sense in such attempts to depict the situation in Croatia, as they do not

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correspond to reality and are detrimental to the interests of development of Croatian democracy and enabling the Croatian people to govern its state now that it has one. It can govern it sensibly and effectively only in this way of pursuing this policy of involving all forces, all those people who accept this program of democratic Croatia, a sovereign Croatia regardless of their past because reverting to vengeance would lead to unrest. Let us see what is going on in some countries. Croatia still faces a number of very important tasks.

[Unidentified correspondent] I want to return to foreign policy. Mr. President, can you tell us what the latest date is that Croatia will accept for the start-up of the demilitarization of eastern Slavonia and Baranja, and will the talks on mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia be resumed? Thank you.

[Tudjman] The main aim of my talks in Paris just now was to explain to the most important international factors — from our host, President Chirac, who naturally has also had talks with others, including Milosevic, to President Clinton and Butrus-Ghali — that Croatia could no longer postpone a solution for this. I explained that Croatia had refrained from seeking a military solution to the occupied Croatian lower Danube area, not only in order to avoid fresh casualties and ruined towns, but also in order not to endanger the peace process. At the same time, we could not be reconciled with any idea that might mean a delay of six months or a year, and so on.

We obtained assurances that this would be resolved in keeping with what was achieved at Dayton, namely that an interim administration would be appointed. I said that it had already been appointed — which will be made public probably today — by a U.S. general who will be responsible for both civilian and military issues, and will guarantee that this agreement is implemented and that the forces authorized to carry out these tasks would be found.

[Vukaric] Kresimir Vukaric from the editorial board of DRZAVNOSTI. Mr. President, how will the HDZ resolve the question of Zagreb? I am thinking about the constituting of the city assembly, the election of the mayor, and all the [word indistinct] in Zagreb.

[Tudjman] We will resolve the problem of the constituting of the city and county leaderships in the spirit of democracy and in the spirit of the laws passed by this democratic state. In this matter, I, as head of state, am constitutionally bound and obliged to ensure the normal functioning of the state authorities. This normal functioning of the state authorities would not be possible if in Zagreb and in the county of Zagreb, which make up over one quarter of Croatia, a local government were to be set up that would be the adversary of Croatian state policy.

Whether people have been conscious of it or not, we have been facing resistance to the establishment of an independent and sovereign Croatian state from the outset, from 1990 onwards. This resistance has been clearly set out in writing. Borisav Jovic, a former member of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and president of the presidency of that Yugoslavia, has written about this. At that moment when it was concluded that for international and other reasons they could not attempt — having failed to do so — the military subjugation and conquest of the Croatian democratic authorities, he wrote, and you have probably read this or you should find it and read it: You should use all your efforts to work to prevent the HDZ from exerting its authority in Croatia and weaken it and compromise it in all possible ways.

This was five years ago. All the adversaries of a sovereign Croatia in the former Yugoslavia — and we should not imagine that there are none of them in Croatia — and those abroad worked to prevent the establishment and maintenance of a sovereign Croatia. They tried to weaken, compromise, and thwart the authority of the HDZ. [passage indistinct]

This raises a question, and our citizens need an answer to this. The HDZ obtained a relative majority in Zagreb as well, in the elections for mayor and for the county. This raises the question of why none of the opposition parties are prepared to cooperate with this party, this HDZ which created this Croatia, this Croatia whose existence is based on the HDZ program, which was something the Croatian people responded to.

Why has no opposition party, if they are in favor of Croatian democracy and Croatian sovereignty, expressed its readiness to cooperate with and participate in the establishment of the Zagreb city authorities, but has instead linked up with extreme left and right wing groups? This is completely unnatural in any political life. This is not only what Jovic said. There were also obstructions prior to the first and second elections, and from outside. One of these candidates today has written about destabilization, the fomenting of a constitutional crisis, and so on.

In the name of democracy as a whole, because the HDZ had a relative majority, and in the name of not allowing chaos to be introduced to Croatia, and not allowing Croatian policy to be diverted from its path by the destabilization of the current authorities, we will endeavor to resolve the issue of the establishment of the city and county authorities in a democratic way in the

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spirit of the laws that we have passed in this democratic Croatia of ours.

[Moderator] Yes, Mr. [word indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent] [Words indistinct] of NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA. Mr. President, a great deal has been said about a luxury boat which allegedly is to be built on Korcula [Adriatic island] for your use. Recently people have again begun speaking about a very luxurious sailing boat called Vila Velebit. Can you confirm that a luxury sailing boat is being built for you?

[Tudjman] This is just what I have been talking about — efforts to compromise and destabilize the authorities, including the president of the Republic himself, instead of respecting this institution. I have never heard of such a boat. And today when I asked my people if anyone had asked them if someone was building a boat for me, they said no. I said, make sure you ask around properly. So no one from my office or my close colleagues [as heard]. Ten minutes before I came to this news conference I was informed that yes, such a boat does exist as part of the Yugoslav navy, a ship of the Yugoslav navy, with which neither the office of the president nor the president can have any connection. But there is something here. I accepted...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Excuse me, was it the Croatian or Yugoslav navy?

[Tudjman] The Croatian navy, did I say Yugoslav navy?

[Correspondent] You said Yugoslav navy.

[Tudjman] No, surely not, I am sorry [laughs]. I received the answer that this boat exists within the Croatian navy. I do not know whether they inherited it and baptized it anew [laughs]. But of course I was one of those who, upon the establishment of an independent Croatian state, said that one of the first tasks of the [word indistinct] would be to restore the glory of the Croatian people as regards maritime affairs.

And I can tell you now that when we were setting the date for Navy Day, and people came along with proposals that this should be some date from recent times when we established our navy. I said: History did not begin with us. Please find me a date in Croatian maritime affairs which goes back as far as possible in history. So we came up with the victory of [King] Domagoj over the Venetians [late Middle Ages]. And there was also a proposal that a Croatian warship should be called Vukovar, and I said that Vukovar is a symbol of Croatian pride in the current struggle of the Croatian people for the establishment of... [changes thought] But in Croatian waters we must seek a name from Croatian history and affirm the Croatian state and Croatian maritime affairs by reference to our traditions there, and so this ship was called Petar Kresimir [king in late Middle Ages].

So with its long coast, its 1,000 islands, its inlets and so on and, with the beauty of this sea, Croatia should be affirmed as a Croatian maritime country both in a commercial sense but also in a military sense.

Perhaps it is here that the reason for your question is to be found. Two years ago or so I agreed to be the patron of the Vila Velebit association, which existed to develop the traditions of Croatian maritime affairs. Just a few days ago I was given two books on fishing, and maritime maps of the Croatian Adriatic, etc. We must do everything to ensure that Croatian maritime affairs are as developed as possible in an independent and sovereign Croatia.

But, of course, I have heard suggestions that the president of the Republic should not need an airplane. Probably he should travel for example to Paris or to other international conferences by bicycle or on a donkey [laughs].

You see, there are irresponsible people who are doing everything to see that the current authorities who have brought about an independent Croatia are compromised, weakened, and diverted so as to alter the direction of Croatian policy. The Croatian people must be aware of this. But we will not allow this to happen. The Croatian people have proven to be mature under conditions in which few believed that a free Croatia could come into being. But such a Croatia exists, and is not only recognized internationally but has changed the strategic balance of power and made possible everything that has come about with this peace process and the signing of this agreement.

[Moderator] Yes please, sir.

[Bakovic] Ante Bakovic of NAROD. Mr. President, I would like to ask two questions of you in connection with my motherland Bosnia — the questions that are put to me on a daily basis by Croats from Bosnia. Before that I would like to extend my warmest greetings to you, greetings from your one-time colleague from our first electoral headquarters.

My first question is: The number of Croats in Bosnia is constantly decreasing. The Serbs are doing it in a brutal way, as in the Banja Luka diocese, while the Muslims are doing it in a more refined way, as in Sarajevo and central Bosnia. The Croats in Bosnia are open and ready to live together both with the Muslims and the Serbs. After the signing of the Washington agreement several

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thousand Croats, particularly the youth, from central Bosnia, left Bosnia.

My question is: Following the signing of the Paris agreement yesterday, after Dayton, and once NATO troops leave Bosnia, who will protect those few Croats and keep them in Bosnia? That is my first question. My second question: There are four universities and two colleges of further education in Bosnia. According to what we know, Banja Luka and Doboj will belong to the Serbs, and I suppose that the Muslims will have Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla. The Croats are asking which university will belong to them in Bosnia, particularly when Mostar, which we hoped would be Croat — Mr. Koschnick requested that it should be divided — is to be a shared city. Thank you.

[Tudjman] It is obvious that the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the burning issue for Croatia. In my address yesterday I again tried to explain why it has been the most convoluted crisis in the modern world, and why it has led to such tragic consequences. It is tragic that even after the Washington agreement a large number of Croats left areas controlled by Muslim authorities.

However, as I have said, the agreement on the federation and the agreement to set up a joint council for the cooperation between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole and the federation [as heard] will in practical terms mean full cooperation — the only thing that it will have is the diplomacy as the internationally- recognized state, but practically the federation, that agreement with constitutional principles for that federation ought to secure equality which you justifiably say is threatened. [as heard]

But I think that the Croat nation as a whole, the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Croatia and elsewhere, must be aware that we have no other option but to teach ourselves how to remain in Bosnia and to secure links between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Regardless of opposition on both sides, for such reasons the ordinary Croat may think that it would have been best if Herzegovina had been attached to Croatia. In addition, I said this clearly at a meeting that such proposals — while Croat-Muslim clashes were in progress — clearly of the Muslim opposition wishing to attach Herzegovina to Croatia [as heard], providing that central Bosnia, whose leaders have been indicted with war crimes now, remains in the Muslim republic. We did not accept that, we fought for the Croats in the whole of Bosnia.

I think that the Bosnian Muslim nation will, not that it will but that it already has, come to the conclusion that it has to rely, that it has to coexist with the Croats in Bosnia, and that it has to rely on Croatia. That is the tragedy that has befallen it in this war, from those initial illusions that they would not be attacked by the Yugo-army and that they would not be subjected to the sort of aggression that was directed against Croatia, up to today when the Muslim leadership became aware of the need for such a federation, which would be acceptable for the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for Croatia, which is the guarantor for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A question arises: Why was the peace agreement on Bosnia signed by representatives of the Bosnian Muslim nation, of the Serbian and Croatian nations? This clearly shows what the real problem is, who — for historical and strategic reasons — had to be included in the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. I think that what Zubak and Prlic said at the latest session of the assembly in Sarajevo will come true. They were reacting to a statement by one of the Muslim leaders who tried to shift the blame for these things only on the Croats — they said — I think it was Prlic, that it was completely certain that in the future life of the federation it would be impossible to outvote the Croat people and adopt decisions that would be contrary to the interests of the Croat people.

In the federation itself, full equality of the Croat people will be secured, nothing contrary to the interests of the Croat people can be adopted, with the right to veto, as it is said. The Croat people will have their separate army units, which have played their role since the beginning of the defense against the Communist Serb aggression, and later took part with the Croatian Army in the liberation of western Bosnia. The Croat brigade of HVO is, according to what I know, in Drvar today.

We will work toward a constitutional, legal, and political solution that will guarantee equality, which cannot be brought into question, and toward reexamining the cantonal set-up. Cantons will be both independent and will have to secure full equality.

I think that you misinterpreted the example of Mostar and Koschnick's request. Mostar has been, it is supposed to be, and will be the main cultural center for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the Croats, of course, have to be present in Sarajevo and wherever they will be. The division that you ascribed to Koschnick is not a division whereby a part of Mostar would be separated and ceded to the Muslims. It is a factual division; in the eastern part are the Muslims — the Croats are in the western part.

In order to secure normal living conditions a proposal was put forward that Mostar should include a number

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of municipalities, which is completely normal, and to have a joint leadership for the construction of the town infrastructure. Our efforts will be directed at Mostar remaining the center of the Croat cultural and scientific life, probably with the tendency to carry out some changes in the cantonal set-up, given the changes that took place in the wake of the liberation of Kupres, Grahovo, Drvar, and so on.

[Moderator] Yes, please....

[Tudjman, interrupting] I do not know if there are any more questions, but I think I should say something in connection with Bosnian Posavina. The Croatian people should know that we did not abandon something that we had in our hands. We lost Bosnian Posavina in the war. We lost it in a war, and it was not territory in the Republic of Croatia but in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia was involved there against the wishes not only of some international views but also — at the beginning until we signed the agreement — against the views of the Sarajevo government.

We did everything we could. I have provided information about this. We wanted to preserve Bosnian Posavina, because we knew that it was true that over one-third of the population there were Croats. It is not true that Bosnian Posavina was purely Croat-populated. When viewed as a whole, one-third of it was Croat-populated, but these people have been there for centuries, on fertile land. We were interested in it and, as I have said before, if we cannot obtain the whole of the territory.... [pauses] After all, we could not retain everything up to Derventa, but I said at all costs defend Bosanski Brod. Had we held on to Bosanski Brod and Samac then we would have had it [Bosnian Posavina]. For the reasons of which I have spoken, and contrary to our efforts and wishes, we lost Bosnian Posavina in the war, and now, in fact, at Dayton we restored the area of Odzak.

The international community took the view that the 51:49 percent ratio should be upheld, and so we returned the Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad area to the Bosnian Serb Republic. But we sought the whole of Bosnian Posavina. We could not get it. Instead we got only Odzak. So Croatia did everything it could, and will naturally do everything to protect all Croat areas, and especially Croat people. Some of them who are active here, and who are perhaps someone's pawns, have certainly set out their store. Let them discuss this among themselves.

[Moderator] Mr. Hoffnung was going to ask a question.

[Hoffnung] [Words indistinct] Hoffnung, Radio France Internationale. Talks between the former Yugoslav republics have begun on the division of the former Yugoslavia's assets. In your opinion, when will these talks resume, and what are Croatia's demands regarding the division of assets?

[Tudjman] You may have heard or read in my statement that we consider this to be a vital issue, and that the question of the division of assets should be completed both for financial reasons and in order to resolve all issues relating to the normalization of relations. However, when this will be is a matter for the current council responsible for implementing peace. As you see, the European commission for resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has now been disbanded. A new body is being formed. In any event, for our part we will do everything we can to complete this process of the division of assets as soon as possible.

[Moderator] Are there any other questions? Yes, please, the last question.

[Sekulin] Zvonimir (Sekulin) of HRVATSKI VJESTNIK, Vinkovci, Zadar, Knin. Mr. President, as regards Prevlaka, your adviser Miomir Zuzul said a few days ago in the Croatian parliament that we could exchange Prevlaka for the Bay of Kotor [laughter]. In this connection, can we go even further and ask for the Bay of Kotor, and in return offer them the centuries-old Croatian land — no longer sacred land because it is populated by Serbs and Romanies — Macva, and thus behave toward them in the same way as they behave toward us.

[Tudjman] And go on to Zemun [Belgrade suburb]? [laughter] This a kind of jocular contribution. Naturally, our people should be reminded that the Bay of Kotor was part of Croatian Dalmatia, and that this border of Croatia's should not be brought into question [words indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent, in English followed by translation into Serbo-Croatian] Some people say that the Paris peace agreement was signed under pressure, and that it is being protected by NATO guns. Can anything in this peace agreement be changed or adjusted?

[Tudjman] Every peace agreement contains certain compromises. From the Croatian point of view, what was the compromise in this respect? The fact that we did not obtain the whole of Bosnian Posavina? Posavina still belongs to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that contentious area only one-third of the population are Croats; the other two-thirds are Muslims and Serbs. From the Croatian point of view, this cannot be viewed as a compromise, because Croatia, in order to be able to liberate its areas around Knin, first occupied areas east of Knin on the Bosnian side. With the liberation of Kupres, Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar, Jajce, with the help from the Croat Defense Council and partly in cooperation with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Croatia secured the strategic

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interests both of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian state.

Which other compromise did we make? While our army was on the move we could have liberated Croatian areas along the Danube, from Ilok, Vukovar to Baranja. But we knew that this liberation would have required many more human casualties, much more destruction. What would have remained of your Vinkovac, Osijek, Djakovo if we had pursued that path? But to be clear, if we had not had any other options, we would have done it, but as we had the other option — to coordinate our national and state goals with the goals of international players, including the main world superpower — to achieve this in a peaceful way even if it happens six months later — we agreed to spare those casualties and become the international factor promoting peace and new order. Otherwise we would have been condemned as an aggressor, not to a lesser degree than Serbia — we would have been those who were bringing into question the general prospect of peace and who were causing a possible conflict with the Russian intervention on one side and with the bringing in of new volunteers from Islamic countries and so on.

From the Croatian point of view, we can be completely satisfied. We have achieved all our national and state goals in this period in the most purposeful way. Of course, much will depend on the implementation of these agreements and further developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, and on the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia. Everyone in Europe and the world understands that the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations is essential for bringing an end to the war, and even for the success of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also for the creation of the new international order in this part of their Balkans and our southeastern Europe.

This is an example: After all the wars that Germany and France waged in the 19th and 20th centuries, they are today pivotal countries of the European Union and the example of not only economic but also every other cooperation — diplomatic, political, and cultural. The normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations has to take place, it is a condition for the new and durable international peace. I hope that all sides are aware of it, and most certainly Europe and the world are aware of it; in this respect Croatian policy, thanks to such an approach, enjoys respect and understanding, such that even those who viewed Croatian successes as their failures, and those who did not wish them from 1990 up until now, are on our side. Today we have everything that we have — and there was no need to put some special sort of pressure on us, but to the contrary, we actively took part in it in the interest of the Croatian people, Croatian state, and peace in the world.

Foreign Minister Granic Interviewed on Accord

AU1512142495 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Mate Granic, foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, by Ivan Sabic; place and date not given: "Peace Has a Huge Value, but It Also Has Its Price"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although nearly two weeks have passed since the Dayton talks ended, they are still attracting a lot of media attention, particularly because of the agreed territorial solutions, but also because of the announced signing of the documents initialed in Dayton, and of some new ones that were only orally agreed upon in Dayton. This could be the shortest way to explain — if there is any need to do so in the first place — the reason for this interview with the deputy prime minister of the Croatian Government and the minister of foreign affairs, Mate Granic, who was one of the most important participants of all the diplomatic events related to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] Mr. Granic, after the Dayton agreement all the attention is focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the issue of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem has been solved in the same package, together with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How would you comment on that fact?

[Granic] The world public and all the important international factors believe that the issue of the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem has been solved by an effective agreement, the additional guarantees of the United States, the resolution of the UN Security Council, and the normalization of Croat-Serb relations. Still, we will be very cautious, we will not leave anything to develop by itself. We believe that the central problem is demilitarization, which should be carried out by special forces, and then the transition government, and we have the guarantees that a U.S. officer will be at its head. In other words, the attention of the world will certainly not be focused on Croatia any longer, which we, of course, would like.

[Sabic] You have mentioned that there are some additional U.S. guarantees. What do they consist of?

[Granic] Those are written additional guarantees on the interpretation of the provisions of the basic agreement.

[Sabic] Have the representatives of the other side been acquainted with their content?

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[Granic] It is quite sure that those who should be acquainted have been acquainted.

[Sabic] Can it be concluded, from the fact that they know about those guarantees, and yet have not done anything officially to avoid their implementation, that they accept peaceful reintegration?

[Granic] Logically. True, we have not spoken with the local Serbs about it, so we do not know if they have been acquainted with it, but Belgrade has definitely been acquainted.

[Sabic] The reaction of the leaders of Bosnian Serbs to that part of the Dayton agreement that deals with Sarajevo is interesting. What is your evaluation on whether they will persist in rejecting the proposed solution?

[Granic] I think that one could not really expect them to accept this agreement completely peacefully, but it is also hardly likely that they can prevent the efforts of the entire world. The arrival of over 60,000 members of well equipped multi-national forces is a certain guarantee that the agreement will be implemented. If they managed to prevent the implementation of the solution, it is clear that in that case they, but also the Serb side altogether, would take a huge responsibility upon themselves, and that the sanctions against the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" would be imposed again. The arms embargo would be lifted for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and for Croatia, and the entire international community would in that case take different measures of pressure. I believe that Milosevic will have to take all possible steps to prevent all that from happening.

The Compromise About Posavina

[Sabic] Karadzic has finally said that he did accept peace, that he was giving up war, but that he would continue to fight with political means. What could be the results of that fight?

[Granic] It is quite certain that the Federation will not agree to any new negotiations concerning the changes of those parts of the plan that concern the solution of the problem of Sarajevo.

[Sabic] And on some other details?

[Granic] Apart from the arbitration on Brcko and the corridor, it is certain that no additional negotiations will be accepted.

[Sabic] I am also asking that because on the Croatian side there are some ideas that there should be further talks on connecting the areas of Orasje and of Odzak, which, according to the plan, form two separate areas.

[Granic] Negotiations are only possible concerning the territories of Orasje and of Brcko. In Dayton, Croats and Bosniaks asked for Brcko and Orasje to be connected, and they will probably insist on that, but that is in compliance with the agreements and provisions on arbitration concerning the territory of Brcko. As I have said, no other additional talks will be accepted, because they have not been anticipated by the Dayton agreement.

[Sabic] The public in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still anxious about that agreement, because, at the same time, alongside the assessments that the plan is good when it comes to Croatian interests in general, there is also dissatisfaction over the fact that some traditionally Croatian territories have been left outside of the borders of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What kind of developments do you expect in that sense?

[Granic] It certainly has to be said that Bosnian Posavina is a painful issue, and, I would say, the only compromise we made in Dayton. That is a compromise that was reached after the Croat side simply had no support from the international community, and maybe it is necessary to explain this somewhat more precisely. The negotiations first dealt with constitutional principles, and in that the Croat people realized practically everything that was in their interest. They managed to be a constituent nation on all levels, i.e. on the level of the presidency, the two-house parliament and the constitutional court in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and as for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to stress that consent was reached on the implementation of the Washington agreement, consent was reached on further resolving the status of the city of Mostar, as well as the agreements on the return of refugees and the establishment of a council for the cooperation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation, and Croatia. So the Croat people have been thoroughly protected.

Another subject of the talks were the maps. The negotiators, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his deputy for European issues, Richard Holbrooke, first focused the negotiations on some most difficult topics, i.e. Sarajevo and Gorazde. Practically, the whole of Sarajevo belonged to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just like Gorazde and the territorial connection between those two cities. After that, the Americans supported the demands of the Serbs to retain the 51:49 proportion, which had previously been determined by the Contact Group plan. In that situation, when the Americans demanded that 10 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina be given to the Serbs, and when they firmly supported the standpoint of the Serb side that the "Serbian Republic" had to retain the territory of Posavina — because they thought that a great number of Serb

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refugees had settled there, and that further migration would lead to a humanitarian catastrophe — we persisted in demanding an exchange of territory, namely to get Posavina back, and instead to give to Serbs a three or four times bigger territory in western Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that sense, we managed to keep Orasje, and we got Odzak, but not more than that. In other words, it is true that we did not have the support of the United States and the support of the international community, and that was the key moment. Still, one should see Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole and the negotiations as a whole, and only then evaluate why we did not get the support to regain Posavina.

The United States Has Taken Over Responsibility

[Sabic] Kresimir Zubak [president of the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina], dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations, resigned his post. What was your cooperation with him like before that decision, and what were the meetings and talks like after it?

[Granic] Mr. Zubak is an honorable man, and one with whom I cooperated very successfully from the very beginning, from the Washington agreement to Dayton, and in Dayton as well. If you ask me personally about all that, then I must point out that, in addition, Mr. Zubak is personally attached to Posavina, and he believed that the agreed solution was unfair, and that it was particularly unfair that the international community, particularly the Americans, did not give any support to the Federation to get Posavina back, so he first wrote that famous letter to Holbrooke, and then his own resignation. At this moment I certainly must stress that he cooperated exceptionally well in the negotiations on constitutional arrangements, and I believe that wonderful results were achieved there. At this moment, peace and all that it brings for the future of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has a huge value, but also its price. The burden of that responsibility and of that price is not easy to carry.

[Sabic] It is a fact that many people have expressed their opinions that the accepted division within Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a very happy solution. Did anybody offer an alternative proposal through which, on some other principles, the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be solved?

[Granic] Unfortunately not. This is the first time that one big power has taken over the entire responsibility for the stopping of war and the establishment of peace and of regional security. The United States has indeed taken over the leading position in the search for a solution in our region. In that, they started from the assessments that the stopping of war and the solution of the conflict was necessary and urgent, for some very understandable internal reasons of the United States, and even more because of the assessment that the continuation of the crisis constantly threatened not only a new outbreak of the war, but also the spreading of war in the region, with further complications and a possible worsening of relations among the big powers, which could have serious consequences for world peace and stability. The United States has invested a lot of energy, the authority of its state leadership and particularly of President Bill Clinton, in the success of the U.S. peace initiative; it has invested the prestige of its diplomacy with Secretary of State Christopher at its head, who joined the talks directly, with the very prominent role of Richard Holbrooke, who took on the main burden in order to transform the U.S. initiative into concrete agreements. Such a strong peace-making role and the entire contribution of the United States deserve acknowledgement.

It is clear that the U.S. initiative received the support of all other powers and main international factors. Without that, we would have Lebanon in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and practically this whole region would be left without any chances to progress or to be included into the civilizatory world processes. It is clear that not every element of this peace is fair, but in any case it is the highest achievement that could have been reached, giving the greatest possible chances to Croatia and to the Croatian people. That is what the big contribution of the United States consists of.

Recognitions Come Automatically

[Sabic] The talks in Dayton dealt with the global solution of the crisis. Of course, there is no such solution without the mutual recognition of the states created after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the first place of Croatia and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," but no agreement has been signed on that. What is the reason for that?

[Granic] It has been agreed that an agreement on the normalization of relations between Croatia and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" should be signed in Paris, and this would include mutual recognition.

[Sabic] When would mutual recognition formally take place?

[Granic] Instantly. Recognition is automatically realized through the signing of that document.

[Sabic] What is the standpoint of Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. the leadership of the Muslim people, in that respect? Will the mutual recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" also happen automatically?

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[Granic] It will. Namely, when the Dayton agreement was signed, it also included an annex that anticipates the mutual recognition of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] It would be interesting to know how that process of mutual recognition will be influenced by the fact that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina already signed the document of confederation when the Washington agreement was signed.

[Granic] That can create no obstacles. The public knows that we have initialed the agreement on cooperation, that this will be signed either in Paris or earlier, and it foresees the forming of a council for the cooperation of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; its president will be President Tudjman, and the vice-president will be the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. That council will deal with all the main strategic questions, from the economy to the problem of refugees, and strategic and military issues. It is certain that the council compensates for what was signed in Washington, and that is the result of those signatures. It should be added that the council has great significance, and that it will be the main bridge of cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. As for the fact that the word "confederal" is not contained in the title, that is understandable, because the "Serbian Republic" and Belgrade could then make a parallel council between themselves, and we do not want to have any formal ties with the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

[Sabic] What about other countries created upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia?

[Granic] It has been agreed that the meeting in Paris should comprise all those countries. There are some ideas that an agreement on the mutual recognition of all those states should be signed then, and there is also a particularly interesting idea that the occasion should be used for talks on the process of succession. Slovenes are interested in the process of succession, and less in the first meeting.

[Sabic] Will the process of succession be slowed down by mutual recognition? For mutual recognition erases one form of dependence on each other, thus also removing the possibility of pressure on those countries, which could possibly slow down the distribution of the property of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Granic] The process will surely be expedited by mutual recognition, and the distribution of property will be agreed at the conference on the former Yugoslavia. The international community has already made some proposals that are acceptable for Croatia, and eventually the solutions should be set by the Security Council. We for our part will certainly do our best to expedite all that.

Nothing Comes From Thin Air

[Sabic] Will Croatia also initiate talks on the issue of war damages?

[Granic] Those are two separate questions. It is quite certain that the problems that concern war damages, refugees, and their property will be the questions to be solved bilaterally in the long run.

[Sabic] There is a possibility for compensation to be paid out to those persons who will not return to their homes for some reason. Who will do that, for example, when this concerns the Croats or Muslims who were expelled from the territory which, according to the Dayton agreement, belongs to Serbs?

[Granic] It is hard to give a complete answer at this moment. In any case, the biggest amount of help of the international community will be used for the construction of infrastructure, the return of refugees, and the construction of democratic institutions of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] Does that mean that in practice it is humanitarian aid that will be sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not some large funds that would be used for economic recovery?

[Granic] That still remains to be seen. On 8 and 9 December a meeting will be held in London, at which some elements and principles of that help will be discussed, and the real conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be held at the end of this or the beginning of next year, so that then it will possible to talk more concretely about the forms of help that will be awarded to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

[Sabic] After the peace plan for the ending of the "Yugoslav crisis" has been accepted, can one expect some steps forward concerning the integration of Croatia in the western economic and political associations?

[Granic] The basic requests of Croatia will be to unfreeze the processes of admittance into the Phare Program, the agreements on trade and cooperation, the Council of Europe, and as for security mechanisms, we will ask to be admitted to the Partnership for Peace program. Clearly, the integration in all international financial institutions and the ending of the succession process is exceptionally important. It is clear that after the signing of this agreement Croatia will no longer be a country of risk, which means that the arrival of

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tourists, and everything else that is related to that, will quite certainly strongly stimulate the Croatian economy. In the period up to now we have practically had no big private institutions. There have been some investments, but it is clear that the true period of investment is only ahead of us in Croatia. On the other hand, international help for the restructuring of the economy and of the banking system is very important to Croatia. Without that it would be very hard to accomplish the expected expedited development, and in particular the productive employment. That is why the Dayton peace agreement has come at the right time. That is the most important thing in the post-Dayton expectations. Let me also use this opportunity to underline our sincere gratitude to the diplomacy of the United States on their energetic peace-making role and for the successful organization of the negotiations in Dayton, and let me underline the expectation that Dayton, as another confirmation of the great importance of the cooperation between Croatia and the United States, will represent a firm basis for an even faster, all-encompassing, more dynamic development of our relations in general. In that light I also see the great significance of the present visit of our prime minister Zlatko Matesa to Washington.

[Sabic] Bearing in mind that the talks in Dayton were rather open, did they contain any concrete promises in that respect?

[Granic] All that I have said is based on certain facts. Besides, by the very opening of communications between Croatia and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," a route that leads from the southeast toward central and western Europe is opened, which brings nearly half a billion dollars a year, if one adds up the income from the road and railway traffic, telecommunications, and gas pipelines. So these are very concrete things, and we, of course, have to use them the best we can. Nothing comes from thin air, we will have to fight for everything, but it is important that there are clear chances.

[Box p 8]

The Winner Is Known

[Sabic] What would be your final evaluation of the territorial division?

[Granic] As I have said, that is certainly a painful compromise, but when one views the agreement reached from the geostrategic standpoint, then it can be seen that both the Federation and Croatia have got an exceptionally suitable solution. The Federation stretches to the Drina river in Gorazde, it contains the whole of Sarajevo, and the agreement on arbitration concerning Brcko is also a big success of the negotiations. Almost until the last moment the Americans were supporting the idea that the Serbs should get a wide corridor, and only at the last moment did President Tudjman manage to persuade Milosevic to accept arbitration. Viewed globally, it is obvious that the changes have been the greatest on the Serb side. They obviously wish to use manipulations once again, as they have several times before, but I do not think that they can have any success this time.

[Sabic] You have said that it was only after agreement was reached for Sarajevo to stay within the Federation, that the Americans firmly supported the 51:49 percent proportion. Has the Croat side been damaged with that order of events, that is, how big can the Croats' interest be as to where Sarajevo belongs?

[Granic] It is certainly in the interest of Croats that Sarajevo remains within the Federation. After all, Croats will demand that one municipality with Croat majority be formed in Sarajevo. It is the area of Stup, and that project existed before the war too. Besides, it is clear that the Federation is both Croat and Bosniak, and vice versa.

[Sabic] Another important detail is that the Americans opposed another migration of the population. So, it can be concluded from this that the Croats alone are to blame for not having got Posavina, because Serbs settled there as they were withdrawing in front of Croat forces.

[Granic] I would not agree with that way of thinking. One has to bear in mind that without the operations that the Croatian Army carried out this summer, i.e. without the liberation of Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo, Operation Storm, and the later actions for the liberation of parts of western Bosnia, it would never have come to Dayton or to the peace negotiations in the first place. Second, the Croat forces, together with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, had the opportunity to enter Banja Luka on at least two occasions, but we were stopped by the Americans and western allies. At that moment the Americans, who had already started with the peace plan, believed that if it came to another exodus of around 350,000 people, Milosevic could fall and the situation in Serbia could get out of control, or it could come to a further spreading of war. As for Croatia, we had to take care that, if a large number of new refugees comes to eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, the international community will exercise pressure on Croatia, so that we could no longer act on that territory militarily or in any other way. Therefore, we had to take great care of all these elements.

Besides, I must underline that this is not a classical peace resolution, although the military winner is clear.

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This was a regional conflict, true — with big implications for the whole world, but still regional, so that the concluded agreement guarantees regional safety. Therefore the goal was not the destruction of Serbia, but the accomplishment of regional safety, which has resulted in the agreement as concluded in Dayton. The results of the talks should be viewed exclusively in that light.

Croatia Rejects UN Proposal on Eastern Slavonia

LD1612095195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night in New York, Mario Nobilo, Croatian ambassador to the United Nations, rejected the mode of implementation of the Basic Agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem, as proposed in a Security Council report by Butrus-Ghali.

Croatia is concerned because the report lays too much stress, in a counterproductive way, on risks outside the region, and devotes insufficient attention to the most important part of the agreement — rapid demilitarization — Nobilo said at a session of the Council, at which a resolution on IFOR [Implementation Forces] was approved.

The Croatian Government, he went on, does not have to accept an attempt to establish a new and improved safe zone in the occupied Vukovar area, and the Security Council should not do this either. This would simply preserve the status quo, the Croatian ambassador assessed, adding that, as a result, the UN secretary general's proposals are unnacceptable.

Demilitarization should begin as soon as possible, Nobilo said. He also stressed that the Security Council should consider this question next week. He said the Croatian Government regrets the fact that no agreement was signed in Paris on the normalization of relations between Croatia and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro, and that these two states had not recognized each other.

Granic Discusses E. Slavonia with Russian Envoy

LD1612105895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, today received Aleksandr Aksenenko, special envoy of the Russian Federation responsible for implementing the agreement on eastern Slavonia and ambassador in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

During the talks the need was stressed to pass, as soon as possible, a UN Security Council resolution on the composition of, and number of soldiers in, the international force that is supposed to help implement the provisions of at least the Basic Agreement on the integration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

Minister Granic and envoy Aksenenko agreed that the voluntary withdrawal of heavy weaponry and the departure of extremist forces from eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem will be a good basis for the establishment of trust between the Croatian authorities and local Serbs.

The Republic of Croatia guarantees respect for all human and minority rights both throughout its territory and in other occupied areas, Minister Granic said, and he expressed his readiness to facilitate the activities of international organizations involved in the protection of human and minority rights.

Speaking about the reasons why an agreement was not signed in Paris on the normalization of relations with the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Minister Granic expressed the hope that negotiations on this will continue, and he stressed that this will be a further impetus for the quickest possible integration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. [passage omitted]

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Speculation About Appointments in Power Ministries

WS1812160495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16-17 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Article by K.Gr.: "MON, MSW, MSZ Are Waiting for Heads; Vacant Ministerial Offices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Attempts to find new heads for the Ministries of National Defense [MON], Internal Affairs [MSW], and Foreign Affairs [MSZ] are being continued. The various statements made on this issue by Jozef Oleksy, as well as by Aleksander Kwasniewski and his aides, have provided too little information for us to determine whether these offices will be assumed by people of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the coalition, or by the opposition.*

The press has listed several people as possible candidates for the MSZ head, such as Bronislaw Geremek and Janusz Onyszkiewicz of the Freedom Union. The Friday issue of GAZETA WYBORCZA added yet another name: Professor Dariusz Rosati, head of the Central-Eastern European States Section in the UN European Economic Commission in Geneva. His candidacy is allegedly supported by Aleksander Kwasniewski. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy would prefer a candidate who appeared earlier—Eugeniusz Wyzner, currently a deputy minister in MSZ. According to GAZETA WYBORCZA, the ministerial office may also be assumed by Jan Kulakowski, Polish ambassador to the European Community in Brussels. Most probably these three latter persons are the most serious candidates for Wladyslaw Bartoszewski's successor.

During the parliamentary elections in Russia, Aleksander Kwasniewski is represented—as an observer—by Wojciech Lamentowicz, a member of the Union of Labor, who endorsed Kwasniewski in the last stage of the campaign. He will not be the new foreign minister, but he may be one of his deputies.

A few days ago, the person who was said to be the surest candidate for the head of MON was Jerzy Milewski. Lech Walesa appointed him as the head of the presidential National Security Office; later on, Milewski was a deputy minister of national defense. In the presidential campaign, he backed Kwasniewski. Another possible candidate is Andrzej Karkoszka, currently a deputy minister of MON.

There is no serious candidate for the head of MSW for the time being. Our information suggests that finding a candidate for this office is the biggest problem. It is not certain whether, as some newspapers have speculated, the decision to let the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] take over MSW has really been made. It does seem certain, however, that PSL Chairman Waldemar Pawlak will not be the new head of this ministry.

The position of ministry head will not be the only one up for grabs. Unofficial sources say that resignations may also be submitted by Deputy Ministers Henryk Jasik and Jerzy Zimowski. There were allegedly attempts to persuade the latter to assume the office of minister, but he refused.

It is also worth recalling that Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the Office of State Protection, has placed himself at the prime minister's disposal. There is no certain candidate for his successor yet. It will be a person fully trusted by both Jozef Oleksy and Aleksander Kwasniewski. The press suggested that this office might be taken by Zbigniew Siemiatkowski of SLD. As we have found out, counterintelligence services head Konstanty Miodowicz also tendered his resignation effective on 1 January.

Information that is coming from PSL indicates that its politicians are not expecting to get ministerial posts, but deputy ministerial posts and other high ministerial positions.

Underlying Conflicts Over Posts

WS1812161195 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 18 Dec 95 p 3

[Article by Adam Soful: "MON, MSW and MSZ Still Waiting for New Heads; A Market of New Candidates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *[Defense Minister] Okonski, [Foreign Minister] Bartoszewski and [Interior Minister] Milczanowski are staying in office until 20 December. "We still have time," says [Prime Minister] Oleksy when asked about when will we learn the names of the new heads of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ].*

One day after the second round of the presidential elections, the heads of the so-called presidential ministries—Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Andrzej Milczanowski and Zbigniew Okonski—resigned from their posts, Prime Minister Oleksy did nothing to hide his disappointment (particularly in the case of the MSZ head), yet went on to say that the names of their successors would be known in 7-10 days. However, to this very day, it remains unknown who is to head the key ministries, and journalists can only speculate.

Behind the scenes at the Sejm, it is said that this is due to a conflict between the prime minister and the president-elect. Prime Minister Oleksy has declared several times that he has no intention of continuing the

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practice launched during Lech Walesa's term in office of leaving the final decision on the appointment of the MON, MSW and MSZ heads up to the president. "I want this to be a decision made independently by the head of the cabinet," says Oleksy. It is not known whether Kwasniewski fully agrees with the prime minister or whether he is prepared to restrict himself only to approving the candidacies presented to him by the head of the government. Both politicians have met several times since the elections for "political consultations." They always left these meetings in full agreement and smiling, saying only that progress is being made on the appointments to the three ministers. However, this does not change the fact that they have not come up with any details as yet. Both stressed only that they would like the future heads of these ministries to come from beyond the party apparatus. But, this may give rise to further problems.

First of all, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has an appetite for one of the ministries—after all, the coalition is made up of two parties, not just the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The prime minister, however, rules out such a possibility. *"I do not want the appointments to these three ministries to become an element of a tug-of-war within the coalition,"* he says. The peasants themselves admit that since Chairman Pawlak has fared so poorly in the elections, failed to support Kwasniewski in the second round, and—after the recent opinion polls showing the party would get slightly over ten percent of seats in parliament—they are not in a position to call any shots.

The second problem is finding *nonaligned professionals*. There are surely plenty, but how many would be willing to work in the governemt? Politicians affiliated with the Solidarity movement in the past who have gone on to cooperate with the current establishment, such as Andrzej Drawicz [government advisor on Russian policy issues] or Barbara Labuda [former Freedom Union deputy who supported Kwasniewski in the elections], are ignored by the opposition and backstage one can even hear them being referred to as *traitors*.

According to the prime minister's most recent declarations, the names of the successors of Bartoszewski, Milczanowski and Okonski will be announced only on 20 December. The names dropped as the most surefire candidates are Eugeniusz Wyzner for the head of MSZ, Jerzy Szmajdzinski for the MON, and Marek Borowski for the MSW. Wyzner is a seasoned diplomat with a background dating back to the Polish Peoples Republic, which his opponents bring up against him. He is currently deputy foreign minister. He is considered to be a professional—Chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission. Professor Bronislaw Geremek would be among those who would welcome his appointment gladly. Jerzy Szmajdzinski is secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic and chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission. He was already mentioned as a candidate for defense minister after Piotr Kolodziejczyk resigned. However, he denies that he will head the ministry. His rival—allegedly closely affiliated with the SLD—is currently Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka. Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers Marek Borowski, formerly deputy prime minister and finance minister in Waldemar Pawlak's government for several months, also denies being nominated to head the MSW. This does not rule out the possibility, however, that he will head that ministry in the nearest future.

The reform of the central administration system that Oleksy's cabinet has announced provides for combining the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] and the MSW to form the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs. Kwasniewski has also mentioned the concept in the course of his presidential campaign. The Office of State Protection [UOP] would be separated from the ministry and subordinated directly to the prime minister. It is to be headed by former Security Administration officer and current head of the presidential team of experts Andrzej Anklewicz. Members of Aleksander Kwasniewski's campaign staff accused current UOP head Gromoslaw Czempinski of involving his office in Lech Walesa's election campaign. Immediately after the elections, Czempinski placed himself at the disposal of the prime minister.

On 20 December it should become clear whether these backstage speculations will prove true—unless the prime minister postpones announcing the names of the new ministers once more and appoints only acting heads of these ministries.

Minister Fires Prosecutors for Insubordination

WS1812131995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by "KES, JACH": "Why Is Minister Jaskiernia Dismissing People? Lack of Subordination Punished"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Prosecutor General Jerzy Jaskiernia dismissed Warsaw Deputy Prosecutor Jerzy Zientek and head of the Prosecutor Department at the Ministry of Justice Waldemar Smardzewski last Friday [15 December].*

"This was revenge for lack of subordination in the Kwasniewski case," Warsaw prosecutors claim. They are convinced that the dismissals are a political backlash for not yielding to the pressure exerted by Jask-

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iernia's ministry. That pressure was to delay until after the second round of elections the ruling on whether Kwasniewski committed an offense by providing untrue information in interviews and Sejm documents that he had graduated from Gdansk University.

"I do not know the exact explanation for these dismissals," Justice Ministry Spokesman Andrzej Cubala told us yesterday. "Those dismissed did not implement Minister Jaskiernia's visions of the ministry. The Warsaw Prosecutor's Office has been unable to close the most important cases, for example, the affair of the Foreign Debt Service Fund."

Zientek's boss, Warsaw Voivodship Prosecutor Jerzy Labuda disagrees. "I am completely surprised by this dismissal," he said. "Jerzy Zientek was an excellent and extremely hard working professional. In recognition of his outstanding performance, he was awarded a special prize by the prosecutor general last year. In June, he received a prize from the so-called ordinary fund."

Last Thursday [14 December], the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party coalition prevented Jaskiernia's dismissal by the Sejm. The opposition came forth with a motion for a no-confidence vote in the minister on the grounds that he had supported Kwasniewski's presidential campaign and thus violated the principle of the objectiveness and political neutrality of the prosecutor general.

Formation of Possible Right-Wing Blocs Viewed

WS1512093595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Dec 95 p 4

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "What Combination May Form a Political Alliance; What Kind of Opposition?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The candidate which came from the post- [1980] August camp lost the second round of the presidential elections; he received less than half of the votes. Such a poor election result made post-Solidarity politicians realize that only if they act together can they try to resist the postcommunists. Lech Walesa called upon the parties which supported him in the second round to stick together. He said that those who refuse to cooperate in the formation of a joint electoral ticket would be "traitors to the August ideals." Deliberations immediately began on the possibility of setting up an alliance by the groups which are against Kwasniewski. After all, these groups were all the more inclined to seek agreement because all of them—regardless of whom they had supported in the first round—found themselves in the defeated camp.*

The difference between the Solidarity camp and the postcommunist left wing is, however, that [in the former] not everyone wants to cooperate with everyone else, that people do not want to enter into alliances and reach agreements with others. Some politicians say that this is because these are normal trends among centrist and rightist groups which only reluctantly accept decisions made higher up. In many cases, however, cooperation is impossible due to old aversions and disputes among the parties, as well as to personal grudges which are only officially referred to as "differences in platforms."

The Conservative Party: The Entire Post-August Camp

The party which went the farthest in the deliberations on the possibility of integration was the Conservative Party [PK]. [Chairman] Aleksander Hall, who supported the idea of reestablishing the Solidarity camp as early as 1993, stated that it is necessary to create "a broad political platform which would include parties from 'Solidarity' ['S'] to the Freedom Union [UW], a platform which would prepare one electoral ticket in the parliamentary elections. There is no room for more than one bloc," Aleksander Hall believes.

The PK leader, as well as chairmen of groups that are close to him (Artur Balazs of the Peasant-Christian Party—SLCh, Andrzej Olechowski of the One Hundred Movement, and Zbigniew Religa of the Republicans) would like UW, which is weakening but is still the strongest opposition party, to play an important role in such a camp. As early as 21 November, three days after the second round of the elections, Hall's Conservatives acted as the initiators of the meeting of Gdansk leaders of "post-August" political groups—the Center Accord [PC], UW, Christian-National Union [ZChN], PK, Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], and "S". At the end of the meeting, the participants issued a declaration "in favor of a joint electoral agreement which would guarantee them a victory in the next parliamentary elections."

UW: With Part of the Right Wing

UW, in turn, officially "opened up to the right." It announced that it was ready to cooperate with the entire Solidarity bloc under the patronage of Lech Walesa. However, it gave the right-wing parties to understand that not all of them deserve cooperation with the strongest party of the parliamentary opposition. UW confines its interest to only a few minor parties. It is not trying to conduct any dialogue on cooperation with the strongest parties of the right wing—parties like PC and ZChN consider themselves to be such

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groups, and the movement of Jan Olszewski may also be in the future. "We want to create a serious political alternative to the Democratic Left Alliance," declared Balcerowicz, listing PK, SLCh, the Republicans, and the One Hundred Committee as his potential partners. It is worth recalling that over a short period of time, UW, along with Religa's party, prepared the outline of a platform entitled "An Alternative to the Left" and signed an agreement on cooperation in the parliament. Asked about other right-wing groups (such as ZChN), Balcerowicz said noncommitally that he is ready to talk with those who accept the platform already worked out by UW and the Republicans.

A person who is more open than the UW chairman is Jan Maria Rokita, who does not say that the party should present the rightist partners with conditions in the form of a ready-made platform. He speaks about a "wide political front consisting of UW, an extraparliamentary right wing, 'S', plus some blessing from Lech Walesa." It is hard to tell, however, how much Rokita has to say in UW now that he has been ousted from the party's leadership on Balcerowicz's motion.

The Conservative Coalition: Without UW

The Conservative Coalition [KK] favors the concept of reestablishing the Solidarity camp with parties right of UW, but without this party. "A good alternative to the postcommunists can only be a unified right wing, because UW cannot act efficiently in the opposition," believes KK Chairman Kazimierz Ujazdowski. According to him, UW's participation in such a camp might make it impossible to form a big bloc consisting of most of the right wing parties, some of which are extremely distrustful of the party headed by Balcerowicz and Geremek.

Olszewski: With Those Who Accept My Platform

Jan Olszewski, just like UW, is submitting preliminary conditions. "We are prepared to cooperate with those who are ready to accept the Program of Improving Poland and the 'S' draft constitution," says the former prime minister. These preliminary conditions discourage potential partners right at the start—even those which, like PC, backed Olszewski before the first round of the elections. Supporters of the former prime minister do not conceal that his election result (7 percent and the fourth place) gives him the moral right to head a Solidarity camp. Aleksander Hall, however, rejects the possibility of forming a coalition headed by Olszewski and does not believe in closer cooperation with him. "The former prime minister has so far always chosen to establish small organizations which were not interested in cooperation even with partners whose platforms were close to their own," says the leader of the conservatives. Aside from these problems, [ZChN Chairman] Ryszard Czarnecki has certain doubts regarding Olszewski's platform: "It looks like the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland will be a dogmatic formation leaning toward the left in the area of the economy," says the ZChN chairman.

PC: Neither With Olszewski, Nor With Walesa

The two parties which have been the strongest right-wing groups so far did not field their own candidates in the elections. ZChN is today part of Lech Walesa's camp and its leaders do not rule out participation in a wide post-Solidarity bloc, even though a lot seems to indicate that it would feel better in a smaller right-wing coalition—one that would first of all not include UW, which is still arousing bad feelings in ZChN.

PC endorsed Jan Olszewski right before the first round of the elections, but for the time being it does not look like Jaroslaw Kaczynski's party will enter the former prime minister's camp. Kaczynski himself has decided that he will back out of politics, because he does not intend to form a bloc together with either Olszewski or Walesa—as he believes, after the presidential elections only these two politicians have a chance to become the integrators of the right side of the political scene. "I believe that PC ought to take part in the bloc, but I cannot see a place for myself in either of these two groups," says the PC chairman. However, his aides, who are going to stay with the party, say that even when Kaczynski splits with them, the party will not join either Olszewski's movement or Walesa's bloc.

Without Walesa

Nonetheless, the fate of the integration initiatives in most of the post-Solidarity parties will largely depend on what decisions Lech Walesa makes in the next few weeks. He is the main point of reference for the anticommunist opposition; during the campaign he attracted many right-wing and center-right groups—both parliamentary parties (BBWR and Confederation for an Independent Poland—KPN) and extraparliamentary ones (Movement for the Republic, Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord, National-Democratic Party—SND, National Right Wing). In addition, he received unequivocal support before the second round even from parties which were traditionally critical of the president, such as PK and UW.

However, on the right wing there are also declared opponents of Lech Walesa who go so far as to demand that he leave the political scene, which they treat as one of the preconditions for the possibility of accepting any integration initiatives. One of them is Jan Olszewski, who believes that Walesa "should move

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away from political activity for some time." Leszek Balcerowicz and UW say the same, but more delicately: "It is important to Poland—also for its international position—that Walesa maintain his political authority; for this reason, he should not engage in ongoing political affairs."

With Walesa in the Background

Many other politicians are ready for integration, even under Walesa's patronage, but certainly not under his formal leadership; the latter, they fear, would cause very negative consequences for the opposition. They believe that the right wing would be treated just like the subsequent politicians were in the president's Chancellery. Loose cooperation with Lech Walesa is also not ruled out by politicians who are not very close to the president today and who fear that as a result of his direct leadership, other parties might be favored in the new bloc.

KPN Leader Leszek Moczulski would like Walesa to play only the role of a "moral-political leader." Aleksander Hall also sees Lech Walesa in the future post-August bloc, but he should not be a "charismatic leader" of this coalition—at the most he should be its "patron or midwife." "Walesa has proved that he has enough strength to attract people," concedes Hall, one of the oldest opponents of Lech Walesa. The PK leader adds, however, that "now he must be given some time to think."

Ryszard Czarnecki believes that Walesa should not give up politics: "It would be good if Lech Walesa became the leader of a 'right of center' camp which would include 'S'. He should be the patron of such a camp; he should specify its strategic goals and act as the integrating force," says the ZChN chairman.

With Walesa as the Leader

Politicians in parties which are closest to Walesa and which have better "access to his ear" voice quite different opinions. BBWR leaders believe that the incumbent president "should be an active leader of the post-August camp." Commenting on the stand taken by UW, BBWR accused this party of trying to "eliminate Lech Walesa from political activity and limiting his real influence on the course of events in Poland."

However, one of Walesa's closest aides, Andrzej Zakrzewski, hints that he would "see Walesa as the patron of the camp, but not as its creator, so that he could keep at a distance from current politics."

The Institute and the Legs

In recent days, the president has been speaking more and more about the possibility of establishing an institute—the Lech Walesa Institute, which would become his "Sulejowek" [place where Marshal Pilsudski retired in 1930's and from which he later on returned to politics]. In this institute (that is, in his unofficial chancellery) Walesa would employ some of his aides who worked with him in the Belweder and in Namiestnikowski Palace; these people would establish his direct political base. According to one of Walesa's supporters, the task of the institute would be to maintain contacts with the broad camp of anticommunist opposition. Such a camp would be based on several political "legs"—one would consist of people linked with the campaign staff, those who feel sentimentally attached to the former president (primarily BBWR); the second "leg" would be centrist (one of its constituents might be UW and several minor center-right parties), and the third "leg" would be Catholic-national in nature (SND, part of ZChN, and the Union for Real Politics).

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Federal

Jovanovic Addresses UNSC on Restoring Rights

LD1612133895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1236 GMT 16 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Dec 16 (TANJUG) — In order to successfully restore peace and normalize life in Bosnia-Herezgovina, international civilian and military factors there have to take an unbiased position towards all sides, head of the Yugoslav mission to the United Nations Vladislav Jovanovic said at the U.N. Security Council late on Friday.

Jovanovic said that Yugoslavia was ready for a full engagement in the implementation of the peace agreement. Many difficult and painful compromises aimed at reaching peace were made during the negotiating process, Jovanovic said and added that one of the most sensitive issues was undoubtedly the status of the Serb population of Sarajevo.

Serbs in Sarajevo have to get convincing guarantees that their freedom, equality, security and human rights will be unconditionally observed, he added.

Jovanovic said that Yugoslavia justly expected that pursuant to the peace agreement, the U.N. Security Council would soon lift all sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Crippled by the international sanctions and isolated by the international community, Yugoslavia impatiently requests the restoration of its rightful place in the international community, Jovanovic said.

By pursuing a constructive policy and urging the restoration of peace in all of the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia believes it has gained the right to normalize its status in all international organizations, especially in the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union, Jovanovic said.

He said that the Yugoslav Government expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the U.N. Security Council had not yet reached a decision on the restoration of Yugoslavia's status in the United Nations. We have justly expected that after the initialling of the Dayton Agreement, the London conference and the signing of peace in Paris, the U.N. Security Council would reach a decision on a full restoration of Yugoslavia's rights in the United Nations without any problems. This would be a normal continuation of the entire process, based on the Dayton Agreement, which should create a favourable climate for the settling of the entire problem, Jovanovic said.

He said that as one of the founders of the United Nations, Yugoslavia was calling on the Security Council to take its place in the world organization without any postponement, on the basis of continuity and in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international laws.

The U.N. Security Council has again yielded to pressures of some of its members, which has a negative impact on the credibility of this organ, whose task is to maintain world peace and security, he said. Yugoslavia cannot accept constant attempts to impose new conditions on it, which is contrary to the peace agreement and its basic principles — equality of all sides and objective stand towards all, Jovanovic said.

Yugoslavia's exclusion from the work of the General Assembly and ECOSOC (U.N. Economic Social Council) was directly linked with the crisis and war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said and added that with the signing of the peace agreement and its implementation it was only logical that Yugoslavia's rights be fully restored.

Yugoslavia believes that it has no bigger rights than the others, that is that Yugoslavia should have equal rights and commitments like the other U.N. members, Jovanovic said.

We cannot accept to fulfill obligations and to have no rights, or to have more commitments than the other members, Jovanovic said.

Yugoslavia welcomes the appointment of Carl Bildt as high commissioner for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jovanovic said and added that Bildt's balanced and serious approach to the settling of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia would be a good basis for challenges ahead of him.

Army Units Return To 'Regular Combat Readiness'

LD1712132995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1311 GMT 17 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 17 (TANJUG) — The process of reintroducing the state of regular combat readiness in a part of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) is under way, the VJ General Staff said Sunday [17 December].

A communique said that, in line with the order of chief of the General Staff, Gen. Momcilo Perisic, the stay and training in the field of a part of the commands and units was nearing completion and the commands and units were gradually returning to their peace-time localities.

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The communique said the activities were a direct contribution to the calming of the overall situation in the region.

The Army of Yugoslavia will continue to follow the situation in the region and take measures to maintain capability and readiness for assignments in the country's defense, the VJ General Staff said.

Serbia

Seselj Accuses Milosevic of 'High Treason'

AU1812110495 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by "N.B.O.": "The Serbian People Will Not Accept 'High Treason'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade — "The Serbian Radical Party is genuinely surprised that the French did not wheel out the famous 'historic railcar' in which acts of capitulation used to be signed — such as when Hitler forced the French authorities to sign the capitulation — and forced Milosevic to get into it to sign the capitulation of the Serbian people," Vojislav Seselj has said at a regular news conference.

The Radicals leader believes that the Serbian people will not accept the results of the "high treason" signed in Dayton and Paris. "The great powers," Seselj said, "have driven the Serbian people into a corner, but that will just strengthen their resistance and revolt."

As a consequence of the Dayton peace plan Seselj sees "a new exodus of the Serb people from Slavonia and Baranja," as the local Serb population will not remain in Croatia to welcome the "Croatian liberators."

The regime in Serbia is working to the agenda of "the biological destruction of the Serbian people." President Milosevic is today definitely the richest man in Yugoslavia. He is richer than Bozovic, Arkan, and Djukanovic. At the same time the Serbian people have been robbed and the Serbian farmer has been driven to the edge of sub-existence. "The regime is either preparing to introduce an open dictatorship or to flee the country soon," Seselj concluded.

Peace Accord 'National Catastrophe'

LD1612202095 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1210 GMT 16 Dec 95

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, by unidentified correspondent in Serbo-Croatian fading into Hungarian translation; place and date not given; from the "Central European Magazine" program — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Seselj] The Dayton agreement is equal to a national catastrophe for the Serbian nation. Milosevic's betrayal could lead to a shock. During the summer he handed over the entire Serb Krajina, without thinking of the consequences of this at all.

I think Milosevic has come to a separate agreement with the Americans on the future of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak. The political situation in Serbia will turn critical only now. The Dayton agreement is a dead idea. It will never be a reality. A state that has been drafted on paper by the Americans can never be set up. Such a thing has never happened and will never happen in the world. This is only a short period of quiet until the next war.

Milosevic's open dictatorship is threatening us here in Serbia. It is the dictatorship of the Serb Socialist Party and the united Serb left which is to come. Serbia cannot be democratized and stabilized, it cannot develop economically or get rid of poverty if we do not overthrow the government of Slobodan Milosevic.

[Correspondent] At the beginning of this interview you said that Milosevic had concluded a special deal with the Americans in Dayton on Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Kosovo. What kind of deal is it?

[Seselj] This agreement is dangerous for the Serbs in both Kosovo and Sandzak. This implies a kind of autonomy, which would lead to separation in the long term. There is no danger of any kind in Vojvodina. More than 50 percent of the population was Serb even before the war. Now, after the arrival of a refugee wave, more than 70 percent of the population is Serb. Therefore, an autonomy of any kind is only a possibility in principle.

Milosevic is trying to meet all the demands of the Americans, assuming that he will be their man in the Balkans. I am convinced that the Americans now are using him for their plans and later they will get rid of him. The claim that they want to achieve the fall of the Balkan butcher is only election propaganda.

[Correspondent] You have not mentioned the return of refugees. Is it not possible?

[Seselj] Their return is only an illusion. It is only possible in certain cases, for example if the Croat occupying forces leave Knin, or Croatia offers other territories in return. The Serbs will not return to places either under Croat or Muslim authority.

[Correspondent] Will they stay here and become citizens of Serbia?

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[Seselj] Yes, they will stay and become citizens of Serbia.

SPS Officials Praise Benefits of Peace Accord

AU1612171495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian, during its 1400 GMT newscast on 16 December, carries several reports on reactions by Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] officials to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris.

At a public debate organized by the SPS in Pozarevac, which reportedly focused on "the SPS' activity on the signing of the peace agreement, the lifting of the sanctions, and the political tasks in the preparation of elections," and which was attended by "more than 700 supporters of the SPS and the parties of a left-wing orientation," SPS Vice President Goran Perevic is reported to have said:

"I believe that a new period is opening for all of us following the signing of the peace agreement. We have put behind a period that meant hard times for our entire country, all our citizens, and for our party. We endured it all. We endured unbelievable pressures, major blockades, and bitter political strifes that are now behind us. We can say today that we have reached the fundamental goal for which we have fought from the very beginning — we preserved the peace in our country and we won the peace for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"We preserved the peace in our country, which is a colossal achievement and in the greatest part our party's merit. By saying this, I am primarily recalling great danger, great uncertainty, and constant attempts to threaten the results that we have accomplished."

Percevic continues to say that peace is "the basic precondition for the realization of all our hopes and intentions. Thanks to precisely this we are now in a situation when we can talk about project Serbia 2000 — that is, about Serbia in the new century.

"I believe that at present, when peace is ahead of us, when the peace agreement has been signed, we can clearly see the vision of the economically developed, culturally prosperous, internationally affirmed, and internationally integrated Serbia. With its program and its political action, the SPS will definitely know how to translate this vision into reality," Percevic concludes.

On the same issue, SPS Vice President Bosko Perosevic is cited as having stated that "the signing of the peace agreement in Paris represents a historic turnabout. By signing this document, we have preserved the integrity of the Serbian people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entire Serbian people."

"It was the principled policy of the FRY leadership and the Republic of Serbia that triumphed," Perosevic says, "which has always advocated that the problems in the relations among the peoples involved in the civil war should be resolved by political means."

SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic is cited as saying that "the signing of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that a lasting and just peace can only be achieved if the international community supports an unbiased approach and honors the principle of equality in Bosnia-Herzegovina." He also added that "this was a big victory for the policy of Slobodan Milosevic." "With this act, stability has returned to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the achievements of the just struggle for freedom and equality of the Serbian peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been internationally verified, and this opened the doors to equal cooperation of the Balkan peoples and states."

Reporter Zorica Stojanovic says that Serbian Trade Minister Srdjan Nikolic touched on the significance of the peace agreement signed in Paris at the session of the SPS Vranje. "Parallel to emphasizing the great merits of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, which ended the war, Minister Srdjan Nikolic also said that 14 December represented a big day for Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the Serbian people across the Drina. The Drina has finally become a river that will unite the two portions of the Serbian people; that is, the people on these territories have achieved affirmation and institutionalization of the state form in which they will be organized and live in the future."

Opposition Leader Draskovic Comments on Accord

LD1612203395 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1210 GMT 16 Dec 95

[Interview with Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, by unidentified correspondent, in Serbo-Croatian fading into Hungarian translation; place and date not given; from the "Central European Magazine" — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Draskovic] The Dayton peace agreement has put an end to the horrors of the war. In this war everybody suffered right from the first shot: the Hungarians, Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and Slovenes. Everybody suffered equally because they were doomed to poverty and misery. I think the situation will be more stable now after the Dayton agreement. I hope it will be more lasting.

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[Correspondent] In light of the developments in Bosnia, will this peace be stable? The Bosnian Serbs have rejected the Dayton peace agreement in a referendum.

[Draskovic] I would not believe in peace in the Balkans if it remained in the hands of the Balkan tribal chiefs. The world had to put us under a sort of guardianship. It will act as a guardian and make arrangements on behalf of those whose states make all this necessary. They deserve this happening to them.

I have no reason not to believe in the neutrality of soldiers coming here, to Bosnia, let them be British, Americans, Russians, or even Germans, or any other nationality.

[Correspondent] What is going to happen to the paramilitary units? Will they be demobilized? We have met Arkan's soldiers near Sombor. What will happen to units similar to theirs?

[Draskovic] It is Serbia's shame that they still exist. This a further proof of us signing something but not taking it seriously. As if we wrote agreements on ice and held them above a fire at home so they melt. The paramilitary units need to be demobilized. Not tomorrow — this should have been done yesterday. They should never have been set up.

We have to cooperate with the International Court in The Hague. We cannot accept that someone has the right to commit crimes in the name of national interests and then stress collective responsibility. No and no. Every Serb who committed war crimes has to answer for it and he should do it individually. I will not atone for his crimes, nor will the Serbian nation. I have not committed anything, not has the Serbian nation. It was individuals who committed crimes, thus sentencing should be imposed on individuals.

Report Views Sums Needed To Restore Economy

AU1512181295 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 95 p 11

[Report by R. Nikolic: "To Begin With—$2 Billion a Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sanctions have been suspended, so there is no reason to go on repeating that "everything must to be prepared for doing business without sanctions." If we analyze the state of the investment field in the development of the country, we see that the only existing document of this kind is an analysis of the expert group for investment headed by Dragoslav Avramovic, the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. Although this group's work, as well as that of other expert groups (from November last year until April this year) was frequently criticized by one section of the expert public, now it can be seen how justified their efforts were. "Assessments and Recommendations Regarding Investment Plans and Policy" is the official title of the document, and it represents a unique list of investment projects essential for Yugoslav society.

Equally significant is one detail that says that, in selecting investment projects for the next three years, the World Bank's methodology was observed to make it possible for foreign investors to participate in financing. Of the heap of projects proposed, around 100 were considered by the investment group at its many sessions. Considering what was urgent, necessary and of vital significance for the Yugoslav economy and society, the expert group calculated that the investment over three years, including circulating capital and reconditioning, would amount to $8.5 billion. And in terms of the most urgent investment projects, needs range between $1.5 to 2 billion a year.

Electricity Production in the First Place

Undoubtedly, these are huge sums. Such a great amount, unfortunately, is necessary, because the rate of capital investment has steadily decreased over the past few years. For instance, development investment in 1990 made up 19 percent of the Yugoslav Gross National Product, but fell in 1994 to around 12 percent. How to find money is a particular problem. Cuts in domestic spending is certainly not the right choice, because it has already been reduced. Therefore the remaining possibility is to get money from abroad.

No matter how it is viewed, development investment is essential to prevent further crippling of the Yugoslav economy, even without sanctions.

This sort of investment, according to the investment program devised by the expert group of Avramovic, has as its priority investment in electricity production, railroads, traffic, the transportation system, waterworks, and the installation of natural gas and heating plants. So, for instance, the priorities of investing in the Electricity Board of Serbia are: Renovation and modernization of thermal power plants, completion of the construction of the Kolubara B thermal power plant, renovation and modernization of hydroelectric power stations, and investment in transmission capacities. The total investment for those purposes amounts to around $2.4 billion.

Then there is investment in the Electricity Board of Montenegro: Completion of facilities of the technical system of operative control, renovation of the Perucica hydroelectric power station and of the Pljevlja thermal power station, and construction of a transmission and distribution network. The needs of Serbia's Electricity

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Board require less money, but, including reconditioning, it still amounts to $200 million. A more ambitious option anticipates the construction of new facilities, such as the hydroelectric power station on the Komarnica and the Moraca Rivers, worth all together $530 million.

Investment in the Transportation System

The second priority is investment in the railroads. Thus the reconditioning of the Belgrade-Nis railroad, the modernization of the Belgrade-Subotica railroad, the construction of the new Valjevo-Loznica railroad, in addition to the electrification and modernization of the Lapovo-Kraljevo-Pozega railroad, would cost around $1.3 billion. If we add to this the needs of the Montenegrin railroads (the reconditioning and electrification of the Niksic-Podgorica railroad, reconditioning of the Gostun-Podgorica-Bar railroad, workshop capacities, maintenance and electrification of the Podgorica-Albanian border railroad) then the investment is increased by around $215 million.

After that there is investment in the transportation system, main road connections that are of international importance, the construction of an extension to the E-75 highway, from the FRY border via Subotica to Feketic, repair programs for main roads, and the construction of bypasses around the major cities. This involves huge sums, while the extension to the E-75 highway alone would cost around $90 million.

Inland and maritime navigation also requires investment, because it is necessary to construct a terminal at the port of Bar, while investment in water resources management again requires an additional $500,000.

There are also programs for gas installation and improvements to heating systems nationwide, so that the gas installation of western Serbia alone requires $45 million, for eastern and southern Serbia $150 million, while investment plans for Belgrade, the construction of a heat-transmission line from Obrenovac to Belgrade, a water-transmission line from Makis to Mladenovac, and a highway bypass around Belgrade exceed $1 billion.

Development of Agriculture

The path followed by the working group for investment in agriculture is based on the need to change the structure of production. If the new investment program in development led to a change in the production structure, discrepancies would be easily removed, given the possibility of exporting raspberries, strawberries, sour cherries, forest fruits, and medicinal herbs, which, as has been demonstrated this year, can be a source of considerable income.

Thus, new investment plans involve projects proposed by many potential investors, from Porecje in Vucja, DBR Internacional in Osipaonica, to the Nis Dairy-Plant and the PIK Kovin food-processing plant.

The investment working group included in its program many projects in industry (14 October plant in Krusevo, Sartid 1913 plant in Smederevo, Magnohrom in Kraljevo, and so forth) and small businesses, where potential investment costs would not exceed 1 million German marks.

All the proposed and analyzed projects, with established dynamics of investing and costs, were submitted to the government for consideration in the middle of the year. This means that the proposals on priority and necessary investment already exist.

The criteria used for the selection of projects have been adjusted to the methodology of the World Bank, which are: urgency, export orientation, lessening of the country's dependence on imports, more job opportunities, protection of the environment, minimal energy consumption, a structure of financing providing a part of the funds from domestic sources, and compliance with standards of quality. Which is to say, an investment program in development is ready, so what remains is to make a lot of effort and money to implement it.

Commentary Attacks Montenegrin Dodge Draft Appeal

AU1812100795 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 14 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Dusan Jolic: "An Insane Appeal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Montenegrin Liberals have made an appeal at their extraordinary congress in Cetinje that may induce young people to take a wrong path, from which a comeback is very uncertain. The appeal was made to future draftees not to turn up for army service, and do everything to dodge such service in the occupying Serbian army.

Slavko Perovic's Liberals not only do not recognize the FRY as their fatherland, but do not recognize it as a state respected by the world, as was confirmed by the participation and equal treatment of the Yugoslav delegation at the peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.

Perovic's Liberals previously viewed the Yugoslav Army as an occupying force, but now for the first time they have appealed to young Montenegrins to dodge the draft in the Yugoslav Army at any price. No wonder such an appeal has been made by them, as they are not fit for army service, anyway, but what is surprising is the overwhelming support from all the participants

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at the Liberals' convention. Just one delegate of a younger generation at the convention dissented, but not in insisting that service in the Yugoslav Army ought not be dodged, but to make the point that such dodging is only acceptable if there are the conditions for those young men to be protected from prosecution as a result of dodging the call-up.

The Montenegrin Liberal leader has described himself as a fighter for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Montenegro solely by democratic means. The appeal for a boycott of conscription into the army, whose exclusive task is to defend the sovereignty of the country and ensure a peaceful life for its citizens, cannot be viewed as a democratic practice. It could be better defined by a term that refers to those who regard foreigners as their masters.

The Montenegrin public is even more astonished by this event in Cetinje and the realization that the extraordinary congress was welcomed and followed by the leaders of some parliamentary political parties who are quite devoted to Serbdom, since Perovic's appeal for the disintegration of the joint state left them unmoved.

We believe that the appeal for a boycott of the most honorable role in the life of every man, which has always been particularly admired in Montenegro, will turn out to be nothing more than the liberals firing into the air. Young people know how to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys and to make a decision of which neither they nor their families will be ashamed.

Montenegro

Bulatovic on 'Happier Future' With Peace Accord

AU1512181495 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Dec 95

[Report by Miodrag Vukovic from Podgorica—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vukovic] Yesterday's signing of the peace agreement in Paris was received in Montenegro with visible relief and a belief that there will never again be war in these regions. Ordinary citizens, as well as officials, proclaim this act to be historic, convinced that Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will manage very soon to return to European and world trends.

One of the first to react was one of the witnesses of that historic act, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic. Addressing the Montenegrin media immediately after the accord was signed, the Montenegrin head of state assessed this momentous event as follows:

[Bulatovic] Much more political and diplomatic analysis will probably be needed, but it is obvious that after a long time, the world is now confronted with such a significant diplomatic occasion of global, planetary proportions. Unfortunately, the occasion was the war of two and a half years in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

My personal feelings on the occasion of this grandiose world gathering were that it is today that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in fact formally ended and that it paid to make this huge effort, the big endeavor, and, I would say, also the painful compromises that have been reached during these vexatious three-week negotiations in Dayton.

Finally, the entire world has shown how honestly it desires peace in Bosnia and on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia, to what extent it is ready to help, and all the greatest world statesmen gladly arrived in this beautiful city, so (?this city) can again mark a beginning of a more peaceful, more rational, and calmer life on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia.

(?I repeat my impression), I hope and honestly believe, and as much as I will be able, I will contribute to it myself. As of today, since this gathering and agreement in Paris, a new and happier future has begun for all peoples and states on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia.

Opposition's Perovic May Face Criminal Charges

AU1812100595 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 95 p 17

[Article by D.B.: "Preparation of Criminal Charges Against Slavko Perovic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 14 December—We have learned unofficially that a preliminary court procedure against Slavko Perovic, president of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, is currently under way. At the party's extraordinary congress in Cetinje last weekend, many words were uttered that could constitute a criminal act, bearing in mind that they were uttered by the leader of a political party and that some of the views were also contained in documents adopted in Cetinje four days ago. Slavko Perovic called for a boycott of the Yugoslav Army and the same also appeared in a declaration on youth, where it was suggested to young men not to respond to their call-up papers. Parallel to this, Perovic poured forth a lot of chauvinist wrath and spoke of the Serbian people as being allegedly unworthy of understanding and carrying out the moral ideals of heroism. He does not portray his own people in a much better light either, calling them frightened and misled.

"At the latest assembly session, we witnessed everything that was being said against the Yugoslav Army. I do not believe that anybody can hide from the responsibility for

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this speech with immunity. One cannot undermine military and defense strength, reveal state secrets, or sow ethnic and religious hatred, divisions, and intolerance with a speech. One cannot insult the reputation of the FRY, and one cannot call for a boycott of the draft and for dodging national service, Milorad Latkovic, justice minister in the Montenegrin Government, said in Milocer few days ago, in talks with State Prosecutor Vlado Susovic and the public prosecutors of Montenegro.

'Major Purge' Occurs in State Security Service

AU1512143695 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 95 pp 16-17

[Commentary by Seki Radoncic: "The New Mirror of the Regime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After seven months of silence, of assessments and evaluations, last week the Montenegrin leadership made big personnel changes in the police. Without any ceremony or major compromises, Montenegro's State Security Service [Sluzba Drzavne Bezbjednosti—SDB] personnel was completely restructured and new heads were appointed at the main security centers in the republic.

Far from the eyes of the public, the skeleton of the State Security Service of Montenegro was changed, so that nearly all the leading men of this institution at republic and municipal levels were changed or moved around. Vukasin Maras, the recently appointed deputy minister of police, himself got a deputy. He is Radivoje Martinovic, until recently the head of the First Command [Prva Uprava] of the Montenegrin SDB. Aleksandar Mostrokol was appointed the head of the First Command; before, he had very successfully headed the Herceg-Novi SDB and that during the sensitive period when the status of Prevlaka had still not been solved.

New SDB heads were also appointed in Bar, Niksic, and Bijelo Polje. Bar's SDB will in future be headed by Dragan Ljesnjak, who was hitherto the chief inspector at the First Command of the Montenegrin SDB and the Niksic SDB will be headed by Ilija Asanovic, hitherto the chief inspector of the republic SDB. The Bijelo Polje SDB, which covers the entire northern part of Montenegro, will be headed by Bogdan Mrdak, hitherto an inspector at the Ministry of the Interior. Our sources at the Montenegrin Interior Ministry also anticipate big changes in the Podgorica SDB.

Parallel to the changes in the SDB of Montenegro, changes were made in Public Security [Javna Bezbjednost—JB] in the biggest security centers in the republic. It all started a month ago, when Goran Zugic, the head of the Herceg-Novi JB, was removed. His place was taken by Radivoje Bozovic, a hotel manager. Ten days ago, the controversial Goran Zugic was promoted and, despite opposition from some officers from Podgorica, he was appointed head of the biggest security center in Montenegro: the security center of Podgorica. The new head of the security center in Niksic is Tihomir Milovic, who hitherto was a judge at the court of first instance. Vaso Baosic was appointed head of the security center in Bar. He was already in that post, but with a temporary status, and before that he had been the head of the special units of the Montenegrin Interior Ministry. Pljevlje also got a new head of its security center. He is Radenko Minic, formerly the chief inspector of the Montenegrin SDB.

It is interesting that the third man at the Montenegrin Interior Ministry, the deputy minister for public security, has still not been officially named. That post has been vacant for seven months now. The state leadership of Montenegro, as we have learned, has been negotiating with Dragan Braunovic, Federal Assembly deputy and the president of the FRY Assembly's Committee for Defense Issues, over this post. Braunovic had been an inspector at the Montenegrin Interior Ministry for years and at the latest elections he became a politician. If Braunovic accepts the position, he will probably have publicly to "freeze" his membership of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] and thereby resign from the Federal Assembly, because since 1989 the police have been officially separated from politics.

Our sources at the Interior Ministry say that major changes are under way in the smaller, but equally important, departments of the security service. The departmental heads in Budva, Tivat, Kotor, etc., will probably also change.

These changes at the Montenegrin Interior Ministry were preceded by the introduction of the new rules on the systematization of working places. With these rules, the state leadership of Montenegro, i.e. the leadership of the Interior Ministry, has made room for carrying out the new "working places differentiation."

At the beginning of summer, MONITOR announced that in the autumn a major purge would be carried out in the Montenegrin police. Yet, not even the experts on the circumstances in the Montenegrin Interior Ministry could foresee such a radical personnel cut in the police. Such a number of changes at all levels and in such a short time can only be compared to the purge carried out in the Montenegrin police after the so-called AB [antibureaucratic] revolution.

Where this is leading is hard to say. The current situation in the police under the stewardship of Minister Vujanovic and Maras, his deputy for state security,

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looks like this: a drastically reduced number of abuses of authority by the personnel at the Interior Ministry and strict discipline. This duo has done much to prevent petty crime, but the impression is that nothing has changed in the sphere of organized crime and state crime.

It is interesting to view the new personnel in the Montenegrin Interior Ministry in the contexts of internal relations within the DPS leadership and the increasingly overt pressures from Serbia on Montenegro. If one looks at the political biographies of the leading people in the Montenegrin Interior Ministry, new perspectives open up.

Filip Vujanovic joined the world of high politics four years ago, when, as a celebrated lawyer, he defended the president of Montenegro at a trial in which Momir Bulatovic was accused of criminal slander. Vujanovic won the case and soon afterward he became justice minister in the Montenegrin Government. As justice minister, he satisfied the ruling DPS, but not the opposition. Part of the opposition believes that he is to blame for the large number of political trials and the many draconian sentences handed down during his term of office. He will also be remembered for the fact that, while he was justice minister, the Republican Assembly proposed and passed a number of laws depriving Montenegro of the statehood that it had had under the 1974 Constitution.

This May, the Montenegrin regime "promoted" Vujanovic to be police minister. Impartial observers believe that in this post Vujanovic is a major democratic step forward compared with the previous incumbent, Pejakovic. The drastic abuses of authority by Interior Ministry employees that characterized Pejakovic's time have been reduced to a reasonable level by Vujanovic. In the six months of Vujanovic's stewardship of the Interior Ministry, around 100 policemen have been suspended. The reasons were abuse of authority, crime, disobeying orders, etc.

Vujanovic is known as a personal friend of Momir Bulatovic and Zoran Zizic, deputy prime minister in the Montenegrin Government. That is one of the reasons that many people see him as a man who is "closer to the shirt than the undershirt." [sentence as published] Since he became minister of police, he has been much less exposed in the party.

Vukasin Maras, deputy police minister for public security, was appointed as part of the "package" together with Vujanovic, at the end of May. Hitherto, he had been general secretary of the Drivers' Association of Yugoslavia [AMSJ], whose current president is Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. As secretary of the AMSJ, Maras was under the eyes of the Serbian police. Earlier, he had worked in the FRY Interior Ministry as the president of the party organization of the federal institutions in which Josip Broz [Tito] had also participated. [sentence as published]

Our sources claim that Maras brought more discipline and professionalism along, when he came to the Montenegrin SDB. After he took over the post, he fired some senior SDB people there. The reason was that they were close to former SDB boss Bosko Bojovic. As an experienced economist and policeman, Maras avoids close contacts with his subordinates. Over the last 30 years, he has worked and lived in Belgrade, so that is probably why he speaks the Serbian dialect. In terms of nationality, he declares himself as a Montenegrin. He is also known to be a great Yugo-nostalgic. Politically, he does not agree very much with those who advocate a sovereign Montenegro. There are rumors that Maras is a personal friend of Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.

With the police minister's deputy for public security still not chosen, the third man in the hierarchy of the Interior Ministry is Goran Zugic, the newly appointed head of the Podgorica security center. Of him, it is known that he is a refugee from Bosnia, he is thought to be a good policeman, he has good relations with the leaders of Montenegro, and he has a bad reputation. It is thought that it is precisely for the last reason that he will carry out the wishes of his masters without any objections.

One can say that the top people in the Montenegrin police are close friends and followers of the policy (policies) of President Bulatovic and Prime Minister Djukanovic. To what degree that really complies with the interests of Montenegro is a matter of opinion. The latest police purge can be viewed in the context of the Dayton agreement and of certain indications that Milosevic will be putting even more pressure on Montenegro to compensate for his failures in Croatia and Bosnia. Our sources at the Interior Ministry do anticipate new pressures on Podgorica from Belgrade. Namely, Milosevic is having increasing doubts about the traditional servility of the Montenegrin leadership. It seems that plans are being devised in Belgrade on how to stop even the "verbal" sovereignty of the DPS. If this is true, then the changes in the Montenegrin SDB may be indicative that the Montenegrin leadership is preparing for a battle to hold on to their positions.

The total breaking of the personnel spine of the Montenegrin SDB, as built up by Bosko Bojovic, and the creation of a new one could indicate that the Montenegrin leadership wants to have a police controlled by Podgorica only. On the other hand, the changes within the individual security centers could be seen as the wish

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of the Montenegrin regime to strengthen the discipline of the policemen (and of the citizens) on the "ground," thus strengthening their own positions. Because the police are the mirror of a regime.

The reason that the Montenegro regime has broken the old mirror could be because it believes that it will look more beautiful in a new one.

Kosovo

Daily Criticizes Bildt's Stance on 'Problem'

AU1512114495 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 11 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by G. Mulliqi: "Untenable Equations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the Dayton Accords are rounded off in London and Paris, many members of the international community are so bold as to assert that a bloody episode in post-World-War-II European history is now probably coming to an end. At least, both officials of Western states and those appointed by the international community to mediate in the Yugoslav crisis have expressed this belief in statements during the last few days. However, most of these statements either forget or intentionally skirt around the problem of Kosova, which initiated the crisis, and without whose solution it is difficult to imagine any pacification of the situation in the way they predict. In fact, even when confronted with this acute problem, perhaps forced by a question from a journalist or other interested party, they are extremely cautious in their statements, probably in order not to irritate Serbia. They do not worry about thereby annoying the other side and making statements at the cost of the Albanians of Kosova, thus disappointing an entire people that still have not lost hope in European justice. The Albanians do not fail to understand these analyses of the Kosova problem, but are sometimes more careful than they should be in their replies to them, probably in order to maintain friendships even when their friends do not speak as friends and have put them in their present plight.

Vigilant political observers have noticed recently that the international community is increasingly launching a formula for solving the Kosova problem through "autonomy within the framework of Serbia," sometimes with the help of "democratic scope for the Albanians that will guarantee respect for human rights," "respect for the rights of the Albanian ethnic group," and other formulas, no versions of which have ever succeeded in removing the yoke from the Albanians' necks. For instance, Carl Bildt, the chairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, spoke the day before yesterday in London in the same tones that he used in Brussels, and once again put the problem of Kosova in the same category as that of Vojvodina and even Sandzak (!). Asked at a news conference how this issue will be handled in the future, he coolly reduced the "seething volcano" to the dimensions of the problem of finding a settlement for the majority Serbs in Vojvodina and the Muslims of the Sandzak in Serbia (!). This attitude on the part of Bildt shows an indifference to Kosova that no natural Swedish "coldness" can excuse.

Why does Bildt, a man with wide diplomatic experience who is probably inadequately informed about Balkan problems, reduce to the same plane these three different problems, which no yardstick or criterion can equate? How can he close his eyes to the historical, ethnic, constitutional, and political arguments that Kosova possesses, which are quite different from those of Vojvodina or the Sandzak? How can he recommend that the problem of Kosova be solved in a similar way? No doubt impelled by the similar statements by international diplomats connected with Balkan problems in one way or another, but apparently influenced by the "calm before the storm" in Kosova, Bildt considers this comparison offers an opportunity for a solution acceptable to both sides.

The problem of Kosova is not as simple as he imagines, and is not at all of the same nature as the problem of Vojvodina and that of the Muslim population of the Sandzak. Those who know about international relations have their own explanations of this indifferent attitude Kosova that reduces it to a mere "human rights problem." Analysts are convinced that this manner of analyzing the problem and this equation does not arise out of ignorance or without a definite purpose. Carl Bildt and others may have a duty, on the finishing line of the solution to the problems of the Balkans and after the setbacks suffered by Serbia in the northwest, to maintain Serbia's "authority" in the south, always with the supposition that the Albanians, weary from the long occupation, will bow to international pressures of the kind embodied in the formula "the same for you as for the Vojvodina and the Sandzak," and will be persuaded to exercise their "rights" within Serbia. Although the harmfulness of this way of solving Balkans problems has been proved in the case of the Muslims of Bosnia, it is not entirely inexplicable why there is a reluctance to abandon it now that the Kosova problem is coming up for consideration.

It is clear to impartial diplomats and all those desiring a fair and permanent solution to Balkan problems that Kosova is not the Sandzak or Vojvodina for the following reasons: At a time when Kosova was never reconciled to its subservient status even in the former Yugoslav federation, in which it had its own constitutional position with a veto in parliament and the

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Yugoslav Presidency, Vojvodina pursued its political existence in peace, never once troubled by the nature of its position. At a time when Kosova's autonomy was suppressed by tanks and by a ballot that was dubious even by the standards of the time, Vojvodina surrendered its political and constitutional status almost voluntarily in order to be "integrated in the Republic of Serbia." When Kosova held its referendum for the Republic of Kosova as an independent and neutral state, Vojvodina followed the policies prescribed by Serbia with the status Serbia had defined. Vojvodina's ruling representatives have not been heard to say during the last four or five years that they favor a different constitutional position to the one they presently occupy in Serbia, which even the most apolitical may take as implying that they are reconciled to their present juridical position.

Why then do international mediators equate the demands of Kosova with the status of Vojvodina? If one adds here that Vojvodina's ethnic structure is utterly different to Kosova's, it is impossible not to see that there can be no symmetry between them. At least juridically and politically, the Sandzak is in a still more unfavorable position, yet western Europeans do not hesitate to present it as a problem almost identical to Kosova. We do not say that the Sandzak does not exist as a problem, but it is without parallel for people with a mandate to create stability in the Balkans to equate it with Kosova, for the sake of peace at all costs. How can Kosova, a former member of the Yugoslav federation with a right of veto, be compared with a region that then had no juridical status or even autonomy? How can one compare the problem of an occupied 2-million-strong people who have declared their independence by referendum with a region that indeed has problems of human and civil rights, but which is attempting to realize these rights within the existing system? It is unnecessary to analyze the distinguishing features, because they are so much on the surface that that they cannot possibly be invisible to the heads of state, the prime ministers of Western governments, and the members of parliament who dare to stand up and announce that "It must be made clear to the leaders of Kosova that no kind of separatism can be permissible..."(!), as a German Bundestag deputy recently did. If these differences are not properly clear to the members of a given parliament, they must then be grasped by those who have accepted the responsibility of stabilizing the Balkans if they have genuinely undertaken this task with a lofty sense of human and civil responsibility. Untenable equations do not solve the complicated crisis in the Balkans, but entangle it further. The western Europeans and all those trying to quench the fire merely by scattering ashes on it must realize this.

Meanwhile, the platform that they are seeking to assemble in the south of the Balkans, even though the Dayton Accords may have sorted out matters in the northwest, is unstable because it solves none of the Albanians' problems, and places the Albanians and Serbs again in irreconcilable positions. The Serbs, even earlier, were not reconciled to the power the Albanians held in Kosova, and this is why they brought down Kosova's autonomy by force. Meanwhile, the Albanians have become aware of what a life of permanent subservience will mean, even though the autonomy now being pulled out of the desk drawers of Europe may loosen for a time the noose that has been round their necks these last five years.

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